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Abstract: Whether the European Union's Takeover Directive should have adopted a 
mandatory neutrality rule has been the subject of much debate. As the European Commission 
commences its review of the Directive this debate is being reignited.  A view is crystallising 
that the success and failure of the Directive can, in large part, be measured by the number of 
Member States that have opted-in, or out of the neutrality principle, or have opted-in subject 
to the reciprocity option. The contestability of European corporations is viewed through this 
lens as a function of the extent to which EU Member States have adopted an unqualified 
neutrality rule. This article takes issue with this viewpoint. It argues that the pre-Directive 
debate and the post-Directive assessment have failed to consider the core lesson of takeover 
defences in the United States, namely that the construction of defences and their potency are a 
function of basic corporate law rules. If corporate law rules do not enable the construction of 
takeover defences, or undermine the extent to which they can be potently deployed, then the 
adoption or rejection of the neutrality principle in Member States is of trivial significance. This 
article explores the triviality hypothesis in three central EU jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Italy. It concludes that, although there is variable scope to construct and deploy 
takeover defences in these jurisdictions, the triviality thesis is well founded. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, after a long and difficult legislative process, the European Union adopted 
the Takeover Directive.1 The final product was widely viewed as a failure.2 For 
many it represented yet another example of how politics and interest groups 
interfere with the introduction of the regulation necessary for creating a level 
playing field in corporate law in the European Union; another example of how 
domestic politics gets in the way of advancing the overall economic interests of 
the Union and its Member States.  
The primary reason for this sense of failure was the inability to reach 
agreement amongst the Member States that the so-called ‘board neutrality rule’ 
should be a mandatory rule which had to be implemented by all Member States, 
rather than, as the Directive provides, an optional rule.3 A neutrality rule provides 
restrictions on board activity once a bid has been commenced or is imminent. 
These restrictions prevent a unitary board of directors or a management board 
from using corporate powers provided to them to frustrate the bid without 
obtaining shareholder approval for using the powers for such a purpose. The term 
‘neutrality’, whilst widely used, is somewhat misleading as the requirement is not 
that the board remains neutral. In all Member States the board is required to give 
its views – whether in favour or against – on the hostile bid,4 and can legitimately 
search for an alternative and, in their view, more favourable suitor.5 It is only in 
relation to the use of board power to defend a bid where such a rule neutralises or 
disempowers the board in the absence of contemporaneous shareholder approval.  
In the United Kingdom a board neutrality rule, referred to in the UK as the 
non-frustration principle, has been in place since the late 1960s.  Today the rule is 
set forth in Rule 21 of the Takeover Code and provides a general principled 
prohibition on frustrating board action together with a detailed set of specific rule-
based prohibitions, including, for example, in relation to the issue of shares or 
options and the sale of assets and non-ordinary course transactions. The non-
frustration rule was introduced in the UK in response to what was perceived to be 
the abusive use of board power to issue shares to fend off unwarranted bids in the 
1950s and 60s. It was introduced at the same time that the UK’s Takeover Panel 
                                                     
1  Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids (OJ L142/12, 30.4.2004) (‘Takeover Directive’). 
2 See for example ‘Watered-Down EU Takeover Directive is a Missed Opportunity for Open Markets’ 
(20 December 2003) Financial Times, observing that ‘Germany made common cause with the Nordic 
countries to make the new proposals' most meaningful provisions optional. That meant that company 
managements could still use poison pill defences without shareholder approval’. See also ‘EU Reaches 
Takeover Code Compromise’ (28 November 2003) Financial Times and M. Gatti, ‘Optionality 
Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive’ (2005) 6 European Business 
Organization Law Review 553, 561 observing that that ‘if we analyse the main reason why the [Takeover 
Directive] created so much dissatisfaction among the experts, we observe that its political failure is 
ascribed to the fact that the board neutrality rule is not binding’. 
3 Takeover Directive, n 1 above, arts 9, 12 
4 ibid, art 9(5). 
5 ibid, art 9(2). 
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was formed, not as a result of direct government action but through the actions of 
market participants in the City of London who, under the shadow of possible 
government intervention, imposed both regulation and a regulator upon 
themselves.6  
Prior to the enactment of the Directive, a strong view developed in European 
policy and regulatory circles that the UK’s non-frustration rule represented a best 
practice approach to European Union takeover regulation.7 There were three 
primary drivers of this view. First, a harmonised board neutrality rule was 
necessary to generate a level playing field in the European single market that 
would enable the efficient organisation of European businesses: sand in the wheels 
of the market for corporate control necessarily gets in the way of efficient 
combinations. Secondly, this view reflected a strong shareholder sovereignty 
orientation that steadfastly viewed a contractual takeover offer as an investment 
decision for shareholders, not as a business decision which could justify board 
action. The third driver of this view was the prevalent distrust of management; a 
view driven by the dominant managerial agency cost framework of contemporary 
corporate law scholarship. From this viewpoint, although there may be 
shareholder friendly rationales for takeover defences, given the opportunity 
managers will use corporate power to resist a bid to protect themselves and their 
private benefits of control rather than to protect and benefit shareholders.8 The 
context within which the non-frustration rule was introduced in the UK also 
contributed to this best practice viewpoint. The UK’s non-frustration rule was 
formed outside of politics by the multiple constituencies of the City of London’s 
financial community. A rule which is untainted by the compromises of the political 
process is readily perceived to be economically sensible. Although government 
may have nudged the UK financial market place to regulate itself, the actual 
solutions reflect the preferences of the market place, which ultimately is concerned 
with shareholder value.  
Whether or not these drivers of the ‘best practice’ viewpoint are well founded 
is beyond the scope of this paper, although it is worth noting in passing that a 
degree of doubt has entered the UK debate and has recently been the subject of 
review both by the Takeover Panel and the UK Government.9 This ‘best practice’ 
policy debate is a second order debate which flows from the assumption that 
                                                     
6  For an excellent account of the historical background leading to the adoption of the Takeover Code, 
see J. Armour and D. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727. 
7  ‘The High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Relating to Takeover Bids’ (2002) (the 
Winter Report). 
8  The Winter Report observed in this regard that ‘management are faced with a significant conflict of 
interest if a takeover bid is made […] their interest is in saving their jobs and reputation instead of 
maximizing the value of the company for the shareholders. Their claims to represent the interests of 
shareholders or other stakeholders are likely to be tainted by self-interest. Shareholders should be able to 
decide for themselves’ (emphasis added) (ibid, 21). 
9 See Takeover Panel, Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids (PCP2010/2) at 
<http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.pdf>; and the Panel’s 
Response Statement at <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/2010-
22.pdf>.  
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whether or not Member States have adopted the board neutrality rule makes a 
difference to whether or not boards of Member State companies can in fact use 
corporate power to resist bids. The debate and the political wrangling surrounding 
the status of the board neutrality rule in the Directive made a binary assumption 
that a Member State that has a mandatory neutrality rule prevents boards of its 
companies from using takeover defences without shareholder approval, and that a 
Member State that does not have a neutrality rule allows the boards of its 
companies to use corporate power to effectively resist unwanted bids, without 
having to ask shareholders for permission to do so. This binary assumption 
continues to drive the assessment of the Takeover Directive’s effectiveness. The 
post-implementation debate views the extent to which corporations in the EU are 
open to takeover unhindered by board action as a direct function of whether the 
Member State which governs the activities of the corporation has adopted the 
neutrality principle, or adopted it subject to the reciprocity principle.10 This 
assumption drives a view of the Directive’s success that looks to the before and 
after of the Directive’s implementation: how many Member States have a 
neutrality rule before and how many have it now; how many Member States had 
an unqualified neutrality principle before and now have a neutrality rule subject to 
the reciprocity requirement. Indeed, if this is the measure of the Directive’s 
success, then important recent work shows that it has fallen short.11  
The problem with this assessment of success of the Takeover Directive and 
the problem with the process that produced the Directive is that this binary 
assumption on which it rests may not be, and we do not know whether it is, 
correct. Although it is clearly correct that a jurisdiction, such as the UK or 
Austria,12 that has adopted an unqualified board neutrality rule, prevents boards of 
its companies from using corporate power to frustrate a bid without obtaining 
contemporaneous shareholder approval, the flip-side of the assumption is more 
problematic. The debate on the use of board controlled takeover defences appears 
to assume that as takeover defences exist and are deployed in some jurisdictions, 
most importantly in the United States, that in all jurisdictions but for a board 
                                                     
10 See European Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Implementation of the Directive on 
Takeover Bids (2007) particularly its assessment of the impact of the adoption of the reciprocity principle 
allowing companies to dis-apply the neutrality rule where the bidder company is not subject to the rule. 
Those Member States that had a neutrality rule in the first instance and now have one subject to 
reciprocity ‘have increased the managements’ power to take frustrating measures without the approval of 
the shareholders […] this development will very likely hold back the emergence of an open takeover 
market, rather than promote it’. For financial media reports reinforcing this binary assumption see: 
‘Doubts Grow on Efficacy of Takeover Directive’ (12 June 2006) Financial Times, reporting on an analysis 
by the European Group for Investor Protection on the implementation of the Directive; ‘EU Takoever 
Law in Tatters’ (27 February 2007) Financial Times; ‘Expected Surge in Hostile Bids Turns Spotlight on 
Defences’ (15 October 2009) Financial Times. See also P. Davies, E. Schuster, and E. van de Walle 
Ghelcke, ‘The Takoever Directive as a Protectionist Tool’ (ECGI - Law Working Paper no 141/2010) at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616>). Note however that Davies, et al engage with and, in our view 
incorrectly, reject the triviality argument.  
11 See Davies, et al, ibid. 
12 Übernahmegesetz, s 12 (Austrian Takeover Law). 
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neutrality rule such defences would be available and, where available, that they 
would be effective for resisting a bid for non-legitimate reasons such as to entrench 
management. However, it does not follow that a Member State that has not 
adopted the neutrality rule enables and permits directors of its companies to create 
and deploy takeover defences without obtaining shareholder approval. Whether it 
does so depends on the corporate law of that jurisdiction. And it does not follow 
that where a jurisdiction’s corporate law makes such defences formally available to 
boards that in practice they can be used by managers to protect themselves. Again, 
this depends on the corporate law of that jurisdiction.  
It is in our view surprising that so much human and political capital has gone 
into the enactment of the Takeover Directive and the assessment of its success or 
failure without first obtaining a comprehensive assessment as to whether or not, in 
each of the Member States, the adoption or rejection of the board neutrality rule 
makes more than a trivial difference to the defensive capability of the board. This 
article intends to make a contribution to this assessment. It does so by asking 
whether the board neutrality principle is trivial in three key European jurisdictions: 
the UK, Germany and Italy. It does so by asking whether the corporate law in 
these jurisdictions renders board controlled takeover defences available at all, and 
if it does whether in these jurisdictions such defences are practically effective for 
resisting hostile bids. If takeover defences are either unavailable or practically 
ineffective in these three jurisdictions then it suggests that the European neutrality 
principle debate is far too much ado about nothing. If they are significant in some 
but not other jurisdictions then it suggests that a similar assessment of all Member 
States must be made before we can draw any conclusions about the effects of the 
Directive’s implementation; and that such conclusions cannot be based on the 
acceptance or rejection of the neutrality rule alone.  
 
 
 
1. EFFECTIVE BOARD CONTROLLED TAKEOVER DEFENCES 
 
1.1 THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE  
 
To assess whether corporate law in any jurisdiction would allow board controlled 
takeover defences to be constructed and used effectively one needs to understand 
what types of corporate action can have a defensive impact. For a jurisdiction such 
as the UK it is difficult to answer this question by looking only at the UK’s 
experience of hostile takeovers. The reason for this is, of course, that boards of 
listed companies have been prevented from experimenting with the production of 
such defences by the Takeover Code’s non-frustration rule which has been in 
place since the late 1960s. This meant that during the 1980s, the decade in which 
for the first time we saw a significant amount of hostile activity, boards and their 
advisors were not in a position to act creatively to fashion defences. However, 
although prior to this date hostile bids in the UK were a relatively rare event, there 
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are several pre-Takeover Code examples of boards deploying takeover defences. 
Most commonly boards attempted to prevent a bid by issuing a large block of 
shares to a friendly third party.13 Other examples of defences included offering to 
buy-back shares,14 and the sale and leaseback of key assets.15   
In many other European jurisdictions although hostile takeovers have not, 
until recently, been subject to a non-frustration rule, other constraints have 
prevented boards and their advisors from creatively exploring how corporate 
power could be deployed to resist bids. Most importantly in this regard is the fact 
that in many of those jurisdictions small and large companies alike typically have a 
controlling shareholder who has either a large economic holding in the company 
or controls the company through control enhancing mechanisms such as pyramids 
or multiple voting shares. In such companies hostile takeovers are excluded by the 
fact that control is not available for purchase without the agreement of the 
controller. Clearly in the absence of hostile takeovers boards of companies in 
these jurisdictions have not had an opportunity to explore the availability and 
effectiveness of board controlled takeover defences. Of course, in most such 
jurisdictions there have always been companies that are widely-held, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number of such companies is increasing. Nevertheless 
the pool of such companies remains small, and the number of hostile events they 
have generated has been inconsequential.16 
 
1.2 THE US EXPERIENCE 
 
To understand the full range of ways in which corporate action could be used 
defensively we need to look at a jurisdiction which has experienced a significant 
amount of hostile takeover activity and yet has not been constrained in the 
development of takeover defences by a board neutrality rule or shareholder 
ownership structure.  Most importantly in this regard is the United States, which 
provides us with a, arguably complete, set of the imaginable ways in which 
corporate power can be used by boards to resist bids.  As followers of the US 
takeover defence debate will be well aware, in the United States there are a myriad 
of examples of takeover defences. Some of them can be put in place by the board 
acting alone, others require shareholder approval to amend the constitution, and 
others are imposed by State takeover statutes on companies that do not opt-out by 
                                                     
13 See, for example, T.I. Reynolds’ bid for British Aluminium and the battle for Metal Industries Ltd: see 
Armour and Skeel, n 6 above, for an account of these events. 
14 See Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch. 254, where the company funded a trust with a loan to enable the 
trust to offer to buy back shares at the share price the potential bidder had proposed.  
15 See the sale and lease back put in place by the Savoy Hotel Ltd in 1953. See L.C.B. Gower, ‘Corporate 
Control: The Battle for the Berkeley’ (1955) 68 Harvard Law Review 1176. 
16 This is of course not to say that although they are few in number, that they have had an 
inconsequential effect. Vodafone’s hostile bid for the widely-held Mannesman AG was instrumental in 
the then German Government’s opposition to a mandatory board neutrality rule. 
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amending the constitution.17 Here we are concerned only with board controlled 
defences that can be put in place without shareholder approval and only with 
those which have functioned effectively to deter or frustrate bids. In our view 
those defences can be categorised in three ways (in decreasing order of potency): 
the creation of poison pills through the issue of warrants; the restructuring of the 
company’s equity through share issues and buy-backs; and the sale of key assets in 
the company.18 We take Delaware corporations and Delaware corporate law as our 
reference points.  
 
1.2.1 The poison pill/shareholder rights plan 
As is well known, a poison pill or a ‘shareholder rights plan’ involves the issuance 
of a share warrant or option for each outstanding share. The warrant attaches to 
the share and is transferred with it. Upon issue the warrant is significantly out of 
the money and would therefore never be exercised by the holder. However, if a 
triggering event occurs, the warrants are detached from the shares, and the terms 
of the option are dramatically altered to enable the holder to purchase shares in 
the company at a discount. Typically the discount is 50 per cent of the shares’ 
current price, but this is of course a function of the contractual terms that apply to 
the warrant which are determined, in a Delaware corporation, by the board. The 
triggering event is typically the acquisition of a certain percentage of shares, for 
example 15 per cent or 20 per cent of the corporation’s outstanding shares, 
without having obtained the target board’s prior approval. The ability to exercise 
the warrants and purchase shares at a discount following a triggering event does 
not apply to the bidder who triggers the pill. As the bidder is excluded, the pill 
when triggered results in significant value dilution for the bidder. Today the most 
common and potent pill is a flip-in pill that provides options to purchase shares in 
the target; a flip-over pill enables shareholders to buy shares in the bidder 
company or its subsidiary on the merger of the target with the bidder or its 
subsidiary. Importantly, the pill can be put in place by issuing an interim dividend 
of the warrants which does not require shareholder approval.19 The decision to 
refuse to approve the bidder or to redeem the warrants is a decision solely for the 
board.  
The value dilution resulting from triggering a pill means that no bidder ever 
crosses the threshold and triggers the pills. Pills are never triggered. They 
represent, therefore a very potent defensive tool that has the distinct advantage of 
                                                     
17 For example, the Delaware General Corporation Laws, s 203, providing for a business combination 
statute preventing ex-post merger or amalgamation of the target or its assets unless in effect the pre-bid 
board approved of the bidder’s takeover. 
18 We ignore business combination defences that prevent the combination of the target with the bidder 
after a successful bid unless the target board approves the passing of a specified ownership threshold by 
the bidder (see for example, Delaware General Corporation Law, s 203). Although they are potent 
defences (second only to the pill) and place the power in the board to control the defence they are put in 
place either by a specific takeover statute (and therefore of no comparative relevance for us) or by 
shareholder amendment to the constitution. 
19 Delaware General Corporation Law, s 157.  
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not affecting the company at all – no assets or shares are sold or deployed.  
However, as has become clear in recent years, the potency of the pill is not 
dependent solely on the ability of the board to create a pill without asking for 
shareholder approval. As the board can approve of the bidder crossing the 
threshold or can redeem the pill outright to enable the bid to proceed, it is the 
resistance of the board, not the pill, that prevents a hostile bid from proceeding. 
Accordingly, launching a proxy fight to remove the board places considerable 
pressure on the target board to capitulate. If they do not, and the proxy fight is 
successful, the removal of the board and the appointment of members favourable 
to the bidder enable the bid to proceed. However, there is a small US hiccup in 
the logic of this response: namely the assumption that a shareholder meeting can 
be called against the will of the resisting board and, once called, that a majority of 
the directors can be removed. In many Delaware corporations this assumption 
would not be well founded: shareholders only have a right to call a meeting if the 
constitutional documents provide for this,20 and in many corporations they 
explicitly deny it; and if a meeting can be called, or if the bid is timed in close 
proximity to the annual shareholder meeting, many corporations have a staggered 
board which means that only a third of the board come up for re-election each 
year, and the remainder can only be removed at that meeting with cause,21 which is 
a high bar involving some form of illegality or breach of duty.22 It is, therefore, the 
basic rules of Delaware corporate law that render the pill potent; in the absence of 
such a basic rule set the pill’s potency is significantly compromised.   
 
1.2.2 Equity restructuring 
A longstanding mechanism for making it more difficult for a hostile bidder to 
acquire a company is to issue a significant block of shares to a friendly third party. 
Whether such a defence is available to the board depends upon whether the board 
must obtain shareholder approval to issue the shares or shareholder approval to 
issue the shares non-pre-emptively. In the United States the only restriction on 
issuing shares is that the corporation has sufficient authorised share capital to issue 
the shares.23 If it does not then shareholder approval would be required to raise 
the corporation’s authorised share capital, and the shareholders would then receive 
a say in whether or not they wished to approve of the defensive measure. 
However, most Delaware corporations have a significant reservoir of authorised 
share capital sufficient to enable a defensive share issuance without having to 
obtain shareholder approval. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that where 
the share issuance, although significant, leaves the new shareholder with less than 
                                                     
20 ibid, s 211(d). 
21 ibid, s 141(k)(1). 
22 Ralph Campbell v Loews Incorporated 134 A 2d 565 (del.1957). 
23 Note that if the Delaware Corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange the NYSE’s Listing 
manual requires shareholder approval for the issue of shares amounting to more than 20 per cent of the 
outstanding shares at the time of issue. Listing Manual, Rule 312.03(c). 
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a majority of the shares, whilst the share issuance reduces the probability that the 
hostile bidder will succeed it is by no means guaranteed to thwart the bid. This was 
seen most clearly in the UK in the late 1950s when in response to unwanted 
attention of TI Reynolds, British Aluminum Ltd issued shares amounting to a 
third of its share capital to the Aluminum Company of America. TI Reynolds 
proceeded to successfully obtain control of the company.    
Hostile takeovers can also be deterred or frustrated by buying back or issuing 
shares. Buy-backs have two potential defensive purposes. First, the company 
could buy-back the shares of the hostile bidder at a premium: a ‘bribe’ to make the 
bidder go away. This defence is often referred to as ‘green mail’. Secondly, a buy-
back can be used to enhance the economic interest and voting power of a friendly 
shareholder or insider. A buy-back in which the friendly shareholder or insider 
does not participate would increase such shareholder’s proportionate stake, 
reducing the probability of the hostile bid’s success. Such a buy-back could also 
give friendly third parties or insiders a blocking majority in relation to important 
shareholder votes (such as changing the articles of association) or bidder rights 
(such as a squeeze-out right). In a Delaware corporation the board is empowered 
by the Delaware General Corporation Law to buy-back shares.24  There is no 
requirement to obtain shareholder approval.25 
 
1.2.3 Asset sales crown jewel defences  
Asset sales as a takeover defence have a long pedigree in the United Kingdom,26 
and the United States. How this defence functions is straightforward. If the 
primary or significant objective of the bidder’s hostile bid is obtain control of a 
particular asset or division of the business then a simple way of making the bidder 
go away is to sell the asset either absolutely or contingently – if the bidder obtains 
control of the company.  In practice, however, asset sales many be difficult to 
deploy as core assets may not be separable from the rest of the business without 
damaging the business. Contingent sales may deter the bid and therefore avoid the 
need for separation, but it may be difficult to find a third party willing to enter into 
such an arrangement. A contingent sale to an insider risks falling foul of self-
dealing rules. A board of a Delaware corporation may sell corporate assets without 
obtaining shareholder approval provided that the sale does not involve all or 
substantially all of the corporation’s assets.27 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 Delaware General Corporation Law, s 160.  
25 Today green mail is rarely seen in the United States. There are multiple reasons for this including anti-
green mail charter amendments, the poison pill, and disadvantageous income tax treatment. Internal 
Revenue Code, s 5881. See D. Manry and D. Strangeland, ‘Greenmail: A Brief History’ (2001) 6 Stanford 
Journal of Law, Business and Finance 217. 
26 See n 15 above. 
27 Delaware General Corporation Law, s 271.  
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1.3 THE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE BOARD CONTROLLED TAKEOVER 
DEFENCES 
 
The US experience points to two preconditions to the availability of board 
controlled takeover defences and to a further precondition to their effectiveness. 
The first precondition to availability is that the applicable corporate law enables 
these defences to be put in place without obtaining shareholder approval. We refer 
to this precondition as the ‘formal availability’ pre-condition. The second pre-
condition is that, in relation to those defences that are formally available, general 
corporate law rules on the exercise of board power do not restrain, or excessively 
restrain, the use of those defences. In the United States, for example, the generally 
applicable corporate legal constraint on their use is a loyalty-based constraint. The 
courts will subject the defence to a standard of review designed to test the 
director’s loyalty. This standard is the well-known enhanced scrutiny standard 
originally set forth Unocal Corporation v Mesa Petroleum,28 which requires that that the 
directors identify a threat and establish a rational basis for that threat (the 
identification of a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness) and that the actions 
taken by the board are indeed responsive and proportionate to that threat (that the 
defensive action is reasonable in relation to the threat posed).   
The precondition to a formally available takeover defence’s effectiveness is 
that the basic corporate law rule set does not undermine its potency in practice. In 
Delaware, for example, the pill would be a much less potent creature if the 
shareholders in a Delaware corporation had a mandatory right to call a 
shareholder meeting and mandatory rights either to remove the board or instruct 
the board to remove the pill.   
 
1.4 LEGAL STANDARDS AND THE UNEXPECTED 
 
In this article we measure the scope for effective takeover defences by reference to 
the set of board controlled takeover defences that have been deployed in the 
United States. Our German, Italian, and UK corporate law analysis directly 
addresses these types of defences. Commentators have argued that a primary 
benefit of the broad and general board neutrality rule is that it prevents the use of 
board controlled takeover defences that we currently cannot envisage and which 
may be compliant with corporate law.29 This argument suggests a critique and 
limitation of our defence-specific analysis: whether known takeover defences are 
trivial in our selected jurisdictions does not address the potential significance of 
the board neutrality rule in relation to those future, currently unforeseeable 
defences. 
                                                     
28 493 A2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
29 Davies, et al, n 10 above, 4-5.  
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In our view, for two compelling reasons, the strength of this argument is 
overstated. First, as we shall see in our analysis, in some jurisdictions, including the 
UK and Germany, broad rules that cover any board defensive actions are provided 
by corporate law – rules that are no less broad than a board neutrality rule. 
Secondly, whilst it is indisputable that a broad rule enables the regulation of future, 
currently unforeseeable, problems, in our view there are very good reasons to 
think that the future of board controlled takeover defences has no surprises in 
store.  The United States has provided a largely unrestricted laboratory for the 
innovation in takeover defences. The innovation has continued unabated for over 
a 30-year period. This innovation has given us: the flip-in pill, the flip-over pill, 
and the dead-hand and no-hand pills;30 a vast array of complex restructuring 
defences; and a long list of shareholder repellents in companies’ constitutional 
documents ranging from fair price rules,31 disgorgement rules,32 control 
acquisition rules,33 to business combination rules.34 Innovations driven by strongly 
incentivised advisors have been subject only to two constraints: loyalty,35 and non-
contravention of the statutory authority to manage and direct the company.36  
Two strong arguments can be made in opposition to this view. The first is 
that each corporate legal jurisdiction is systemically distinctive and, therefore, the 
product of innovation in one jurisdiction tells us only a limited amount about the 
possibilities of innovation in another. As, for example, hostile takeovers have 
never been a part of the German corporate governance landscape, what would 30 
years of innovation generate with the tools provided by German corporate law? 
We cannot know. However, relativism cannot completely tie our hands. From 
what we know about the corporate laws of different jurisdictions, Delaware 
boards, along with German boards, are situated at the board power/supremacy of 
a board/shareholder power spectrum. Furthermore, board controlled takeover 
defences are fashioned using corporate powers made available to boards: the 
power to issue shares and derivatives and to repurchase those shares and 
derivatives; the power to buy and sell assets; the power to spend and distribute 
                                                     
30 A dead hand pill allows the redemption of the pill only by the directors who put the pill in place, even 
if they have been removed; a no-hand pill prevents redemption by newly appointed directors for a 
specified period of time. See, for example, Carmody v Toll Brothers, Inc 723 A2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) and 
Quickturn Design Systems v Mentor Graphics Incorporation 728 A2d 25 (Del.Ch.1998).  
31 Rules that require the bidder in a two-tier offer to pay the same price at the back end as at the front 
end. 
32 Rules that provide for the disgorgement of any profit made by an unsuccessful bidder when selling his 
shares after the failed bid. See, for example, the disgorgement provision in the Pennsylvania Corporation 
Law, 15 PA. Cons. Stat. Ann, ss 2571-2576. 
33 Control share acquisition defences, whether in the charter or in a takeover statute, prevent an 
unapproved bidder from voting purchased shares until the remaining shareholders authorise the voting of 
his shares.  
34 See n 17 above for a description of such a defence which may be provided by state takeover statute or 
placed in the corporation’s charter.  
35 The loyalty standard is the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test set forth in Unocal Corporation  v Mesa Petroleum 
493 A2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
36 In Delaware this is set forth in the Delaware General Corporation Law, s 141(a). See Carmody v Toll 
Brothers, Inc 723 A2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) and Quickturn Design Systems v Mentor Graphics Incorporation 728 
A2d 25 (Del.Ch.1998).  
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corporate assets. These are the powers available to boards in most jurisdictions.  
Indeed, as we will see in our analysis, the powers of US boards are in many 
respects greater than their counterparts in other jurisdictions. For these reasons, 
the claim that the US has acted as a universalist laboratory of takeover defences, 
and what it has not discovered no other jurisdiction will, is more than plausible. A 
second argument in opposition to this view, is that innovation in the United States 
has been crowded out by the effectiveness of the pill as a defensive technique: that 
is, the pressure to innovate was dampened by the existence of such a potent tool. 
But as is clear from the above analysis this is not correct for all companies. The 
pill’s potency is a function of the rules governing board removal which, in 
Delaware, is dependent on whether the board is staggered. Although many 
companies have staggered boards, a significant proportion do not,37 and those 
without one lack a defensive mechanism that approaches the potency of the 
pill/staggered board combination. Target boards of those companies have strong 
incentives to innovate, and indeed they have, with limited success, continued to do 
so through dead-hand and no-hand pills that attempt to restrict the redeemability 
of the pill by a newly appointed board. 
Of course one must never say never, but in our view innovation has largely 
run its course and now operates within established defence types – for example 
looking at the different ways in which you could put a pill in place or providing 
functional substitutes for the dilutive effect of a pill – and has not for some time 
provided a new and effective type of defence. Imaginable defence types appear to 
be one of the few areas of corporate law where history may have reached an 
endpoint. 
 
 
 
2. IS THE UK’S NON-FRUSTRATION RULE TRIVIAL? 
 
In contrast to Germany and Italy, the UK has long had a board neutrality rule and 
has not altered its position as a result of the implementation of the Directive. The 
non-frustration rule remains mandatory and is not subject to a reciprocity 
qualification.  From the viewpoint of those committed to a harmonised mandatory 
neutrality rule, the UK’s position supports the efficient integration of European 
business, protects shareholders, and upholds shareholder sovereignty. In 
implementing the Directive, had the UK changed its mind and, like Italy, opted to 
revoke the non-frustration rule, the UK would have entered the opposing side of 
the post-Directive impact assessment and would be an example of the way in 
which the Directive has actually undermined single market integration and 
                                                     
37 As of 1998 a study that looked at 2,421 large companies found that 59 per cent of them had staggered 
boards. V.K. Rosenbaum, Investor Responsibility Research Center: Corporate Takeover Defenses (1998). 
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shareholder protection and sovereignty. In the context of the UK, any impact 
conclusions based on the UK’s adoption of the neutrality rule are incorrect. The 
effects on market integration and shareholder sovereignty of the UK’s adoption of 
the rule are trivial. Had it chosen to change its mind and on implementation 
revoked the neutrality rule, it would have made no significant difference to a UK 
company’s defensive capability. To see this we consider the availability of board 
controlled takeover defences in a UK world without the non-frustration rule.38  
 
2.1 FORMAL AVAILABILITY 
 
2.1.1 A UK poison pill? 
A poison pill or shareholder rights plan could be put in place in the UK; however, 
to do so would require specific shareholder authorisation. The board of a UK 
company is typically authorised through its articles of association, its primary 
constitutional document, to issue an interim dividend provided that it has 
sufficient profits available for distribution.39 Most companies’ articles do not 
require the shareholders to authorise such a distribution. However, under UK 
company law, since the implementation of the Second European Company Law 
Directive,40 boards cannot grant rights to buy shares without having obtained 
shareholder authorisation to grant those rights.41 Most listed companies will 
provide annual rolling grants of authority to allot shares and, often, although not 
as commonly, to grant rights to subscribe for shares.42 Typically such rolling grants 
of authority enable an issue of shares of up to one-third of the existing 
outstanding ordinary shares. However, the option grant for a poison pill would 
necessarily have to be much larger than this, as one warrant would have to be 
granted for each share. Accordingly the board would require specific shareholder 
approval to grant the warrants. Such approval would clearly have to explain to the 
shareholders why it was sought. However, in contrast to the non-frustration 
principle such authorisation could be given ex-ante. With regard to the rights that 
attach to the warrants most companies’ articles empower the directors to set the 
                                                     
38 For a consideration of this issue in the UK context, see D. Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: 
Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 267. 
39 We assume here that there will be sufficient distributable profits for the distribution given the value of 
the option on issue. See Model Articles for Public Companies, art 70.  
40 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC. 
41 Companies Act 2006, s 549.  
42 Compare Vodafone Plc’s 2010 Annual General Meeting resolution in this regard (referring to grants) at 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/annual_general_meeting/2010_review_
of_the_year_and_notice_of_agm.pdf> with Marks and Spencer Plc’s rolling grant resolution (referring 
only to allotment) at <http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/specific/investors/AGM/ 
f0ca5adec426451b9d268155f8053541/2010_Notice_of_Meeting>.  
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terms of the warrant as ‘as they think proper’.43  As one warrant is issued for each 
share there is no concern with pre-emptive rights.44  
One concern about poison pills that is often identified by non-US corporate 
observers is the pill’s apparent discrimination between shareholders, or more 
precisely between the bidder and other shareholders. In the United Kingdom, 
claims that a pill is invalid because it is discriminatory are unlikely to be successful. 
UK company law does not require the board to treat shareholders equally but to 
have regard to their fair treatment when acting.45 The Listing Rules which are 
applicable to listed companies go further than this by requiring in Principle 5 of 
the Listing Rules that the listed company ‘treats all holders of the same class of 
[shares] that are in the same position equally in respect of the rights attaching to 
such [shares]’.46 In our view this requirement would not impinge on the ability to 
put in place a poison pill. A pill does not discriminate between shareholders; rather 
it gives holders of shares a right that is conditional on the fulfilment of the 
warrant’s contractually specified conditions. A bidder who crosses the trigger 
threshold has not complied with those conditions and therefore cannot exercise 
the rights. Furthermore, any differential treatment does not apply to the rights 
‘attaching to [the bidder’s] shares’; rather it applies to a separate right to buy 
shares.  
Accordingly, UK corporate law would enable a poison pill to be put in place, 
which formally at least, would give the board the power to approve or not approve 
of a particular bidder. Such a pill would, however, require shareholder approval.  
 
2.1.2 Equity restructuring  
In the UK an equity restructuring defence that involved issuing shares to a friendly 
third-party would be subject to significant shareholder control, rendering it in 
effect formally unavailable without shareholder support. As noted above an issue 
of shares requires that the shareholders in general meeting have granted authority 
to allot the shares.47 Such authority is granted by an ordinary resolution (a simple 
majority of the votes cast at the meeting). Shareholders commonly provide for 
rolling grants of authority for substantial blocks of shares, typically in the range of 
a third of the issued shares. Such a block would be large enough to significantly 
decrease the probability of success for a hostile bid. However, in addition to 
requiring authority to allot the shares, an issue to a third party is a non pre-emptive 
issue and requires that shareholders waive their pre-emption rights which are 
                                                     
43 See for example Vodafone Group Plc Articles of Association, regulation 11.1 (2010) at 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/corporate_governance/vgplc_articles_2
010_agm.pdf>. 
44 Companies Act 2006, s 561(3) applies pre-emption rights to the grant of an option but not in relation 
to the allotment of shares in exercise of the option.  
45 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
46 The Listing Principles are set forth in Listing Rule 7.2. 
47 In any event pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, s 564, pre-emption rights do not apply to a bonus 
issue of shares.  
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provided by section 561 of the Companies Act 2006. Such rights must be waived 
by a special resolution (75 per cent of the votes cast at the meeting).48 However, 
pre-emption rights are not applicable in relation to any issue of shares where any 
part of the consideration is non-cash consideration.49 Furthermore, as with the 
authority to allot shares or grant options, shareholders of listed companies 
typically approve significant pre-emption right waivers on an annual basis without 
there being any specified purpose for the waiver. For example, Vodafone Plc at its 
2010 annual general meeting granted a pre-emption right waiver in relation to up 
to 19 per cent of its shares.50  
Such waivers appear to enable significant board controlled non-pre-emptive 
issues of shares to friendly third parties. Such issues would clearly have an impact 
upon the probability of success for the hostile bidder. Accordingly, it could be 
argued that whilst formally shareholders appear to control share issues, in practice 
they relinquish that authority to the board in relation to potentially large blocks of 
shares. This would appear to give the board significant scope to deploy an equity 
restructuring defence without seeking ex-post shareholder approval and when the 
ex-ante approval given did not amount to a consent to their defensive use. In 
practice, however, there is a significant amount of informal shareholder control 
over share issues in the UK. Institutional shareholders are very fond of their pre-
emption rights. This is clearly evidenced by the formation in 1987 of the Pre-
Emption Group, an informal regulatory body that specifies guidelines for 
companies and investors on pre-emption right waivers. The guidelines specify that 
in any one year that there should be no greater than five per cent non pre-emptive 
issues and no more that seven point five per cent over a three-year period.51 This 
dramatically reduces the shares available for non pre-emptive issues when 
compared to the actual rolling waivers. Directors could of course ignore these 
informal guidelines and in a defensive context issue a much larger block of shares. 
However, any widespread abuse by companies of rolling pre-emption waivers for 
defensive purposes would almost certainly result in adjustments to the approvals 
and the guidelines. This could take the form of reduced rolling waiver percentage 
figures, to the five per cent recommendation or below, or keeping larger rolling 
waivers in place and imposing conditions on the authorisation to allot the shares: 
for example, no issue is permitted once a bid is imminent or has commenced.52  
As regards share buy-back defences UK company law requires shareholder 
approval to carry out a buy-back. The nature of that approval varies depending 
upon whether the buy-back is purchased ‘on-market’ through a recognised 
investment exchange or ‘off-market’ with specified shareholders. In relation to an 
                                                     
48 For a public company pre-emption rights can be waivered by a waiver resolution or by a resolution 
amending the article to that effect. ibid, s 570. Private companies can opt out of the pre-emption regime 
altogether by providing for an opt-out in their articles. ibid, s 567.  
49 ibid, s 565. 
50 Resolution 20 2010 Annual General Meeting, n 42 above. 
51 Pre-Emption Group, Disapplying Pre-Emption Rights – A Statement of Principles (2008), paras 8, 10. 
52 Companies Act 2006, s 551(2), provides for the inclusion of condition on the allotment authorisation. 
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on-market purchase approval by a simple majority of the votes cast is required.53 
This general authority may be given for a period of 18 months.54 Accordingly, if 
pre-approval has been given this does give the board some scope to enhance the 
size of friendly shareholders during a hostile bid. However, the approval must 
specify a limit on the number of shares being repurchased, and as most UK listed 
companies do not have large shareholders, such repurchases are unlikely to 
significantly alter the balance of power in a takeover bid.   
If the repurchase is an off-market purchase, such as the repurchase of a block 
of shares from one shareholder – which could be used as a green mail defence – 
then a special shareholder resolution is required following disclosure of the sale 
contract.55 The selling shareholder and any of his associates are not allowed to 
vote their shares.56 Accordingly a green mail defence requires contemporaneous 
disinterested shareholder approval.  
 
2.1.3 Asset sales/crown jewels defences 
Of our three defence types, asset sales are the least potent. In addition to the 
problem of finding buyers for substantial assets and the difficulties, from buyer’s 
perspective, of carrying out due diligence and negotiating the sale within the time 
constraints of a UK takeover offer,57 many of the company’s assets will not be 
detachable from the other assets without damaging the company’s business. 
However, notwithstanding these limitations, an asset sale of a substantial amount 
of the UK company’s assets is clearly formally available to the board without 
shareholder approval. The Companies Act 2006 does not address the issue of 
board power in this regard or the approvals required to sell assets. This is a matter 
for the articles of association. Typically in large companies the shareholders will 
not reserve power in relation to the sales of assets or transactions of a particular 
size, although it is clearly open for them to do so. From a company law 
perspective, therefore, board power in relation to sales of assets may well be 
unlimited. However, where the company is a listed company the United Kingdom 
Listing Authority’s Listing Rules require shareholder approval for any transaction 
that amounts to a Class One transaction which in effect requires shareholder 
approval for any transaction that has a value of more that 25 per cent of the 
company’s value.58 This means that sales of assets which amount to less than 25 
per cent of the company’s value can be sold without shareholder approval. 
Formally, therefore, in the absence of the non-frustration rule asset sales of less 
                                                     
53 ibid, s 701(3). 
54 ibid, s 701(5). 
55 ibid, s 694-699. 
56 ibid, s 695. 
57 Pursuant to the Takeover Code an offer could be commenced and closed within a 21-day period. Rule 
31.1. Typically the offer period will extend beyond this date. For a typical bid timetable, see D. Kershaw, 
Company Law in Context (Oxford: OUP, 2009), Web Chapter A: ‘The Market for Corporate Control’, 93-
95 at <http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215942/resources/01chapters/>.  
58 Listing Rule 10. 
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then 25 per cent of the company’s value would be an available board controlled 
takeover defence. Indeed they represent the only defence that may be deployed 
without any shareholder involvement.  
 
2.2 GENERAL CORPORATE LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF BOARD 
CONTROLLED DEFENCES 
 
In the United Kingdom directors are not empowered by the corporate statute, as 
is the case in most jurisdictions,59 but rather are empowered by the shareholders 
who delegate authority to the board through the articles of association,60 which the 
shareholders alone have the power to alter. Directors are subject to fiduciary 
duties which require them to exercise the delegated powers loyally.61 In the United 
Kingdom, prior to 2006 the common law obligation of loyalty in relation to the 
exercise of corporate power was the duty to act in good faith in the best interests 
of the company.62 The Companies Act 2006 codified this obligation, which is now 
the duty to promote the success of the company.63 The codified duty, as with its 
predecessor duty, imposes a subjective standard on a director to do what she 
considers is in the company’s interests. As our minds are closed to accurate 
judicial inspection, in application this standard is a rationality or plausibility 
standard: the director must show only that there is a rational basis for the decision 
in order to comply with the standard.64  
If the duty to promote the success of the company was the only general 
regulation of the exercise of corporate power, then UK company law would 
impose virtually no restraint on the use by boards of the formally available 
defences which we have identified in Part 2.1 above. A rational explanation is 
always available for the exercise of board controlled takeover defences. Such a 
rational explanation could include the need to facilitate an auction or to enhance 
the board’s bargaining power to ensure that shareholders obtain the best price; or 
even to prevent the success of the bid as neither the shareholders nor the market 
understands the true value of the company. However, the duty to promote the 
success of the company is not the only general applicable restraint provided by 
UK company law.  
A common law doctrine of English law, of longstanding heritage, known as 
the improper purpose doctrine, imposes a rule-based restraint on the use of 
takeover defences which is remarkably similar to the Takeover Code’s non-
frustration rule. This rule provides that corporate powers formally available to the 
                                                     
59 In a Delaware corporation the board is empowered by the Delaware General Corporation Law, s 
141(a); the management board of a German Aktiengesellschaft is directly empowered by the German 
Stock Corporation Law, s 76; the Italian Civil Code, art 2380bis directly empowers the board of an Italian 
company. 
60  See, for example, the Model Articles for Public Companies, art 3.  
61  cf M. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Oxford: Hart, 
2010). 
62 Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] Ch. 304. 
63 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
64 Regentcrest v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14. 
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board cannot be used to intentionally interfere with a takeover offer without 
having obtained shareholder approval to do so. In contrast to the Takeover Codes’ 
non-frustration principle, where shareholder approval must be obtained ex-post the 
immanency or commencement of the bid, under the improper purpose doctrine 
either ex-ante or ex-post approval would suffice.65 Importantly for understanding the 
scope for the board to deploy takeover defences in the UK it is important to stress 
that this is a generally applicable rule, it is not a loyalty-based standard that 
attempts to determine whether the board has exercised the power loyally.66  
The improper purpose doctrine does not have its roots in the takeover 
defence context but in cases where boards of directors used corporate power to 
interfere with voting control in the shareholder meeting. UK courts consistently 
invalidated such actions using a constitutional balance-of-power/shareholder 
rights-based theory of invalidity. In the 1864 case of Fraser v Whalley,67 for 
example, the board of directors issued shares to friendly third parties in order to 
dilute the holdings of a substantial shareholder. The directors claimed their actions 
were lawful as they were acting loyally in defence of the company’s interests. The 
court rejected this argument holding that the issue of shares for interfering with 
voting control was not a purpose for which the power had been ‘entrusted’ to the 
board. Formally the board had the authority to issue the shares but the court 
imposed implicit limitations on the delegation of that authority – it could not be 
used for the purpose of interference with voting control or, as the court put it: ‘to 
deprive him of his rights’. For the court in Fraser, voting control was so 
fundamental to shareholders that they could not be deemed to have authorised the 
board to intentionally interfere with their voting rights unless they had explicitly 
authorised such interference.  
In subsequent cases this theory of fundamental constitutional rights was 
extended to the hostile takeover context. In 1953, following an unsolicited 
approach to purchase the Savoy Group, the target’s board put in place a sale and 
leaseback arrangement for one of its premier hotels, The Berkeley, in order to 
deter the bid. Although this case never made into the court room it did result in a 
Government instigated investigation by a leading QC, who found that the actions 
of the target board were not, in his view, a lawful exercise of its authority: 
 
                                                     
65 Interestingly, one could argue that such a rule allowing for ex-ante approval is consistent with the 
Takeover Directive and, therefore, that the improper purpose doctrine accurately implements the 
Directive.  The stronger reading of the Directive implies ex-post approval. However, a literal reading of the 
provisions would allow for ex-ante approval. The Directive does not explicitly say the meeting granting 
approval has to be after the bid has commenced.   
66  Note, however, that the rules itself involving a prohibition subject to shareholder approval is 
structurally the same as the UK loyalty-based prohibitions on self-dealing and corporate opportunities, 
which also are not concerned with loyalty in fact but rather with the possibility of conflict. See further, D. 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2009), chs 13, 14.  
67 [1864] 71 E.R. 361 (Ch. D. 1864). 
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[However] proper the motive behind [the sale and leaseback], it is not a 
purpose for which those powers were conferred on the Board.  Powers conferred by 
the shareholders on directors for the purpose of managing the business of the 
Company cannot be used for the purpose of depriving those shareholders of 
[their residual] control over the Company’s assets (emphasis added).68 
 
A decade later in the case of Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd,69 the issue of the intentional 
use of corporate power to defeat a hostile takeover by a bidder who was not a 
substantial shareholder was addressed by the courts for the first time. In this case, 
in order to repel a bid that the board viewed unfavourably, the board set up a trust 
for the benefit of the employees and issued shares and made a loan to the trust. 
The trust’s trustees consisted of the company’s CEO, the company’s auditor, and 
an employee representative. The objective of issuing the shares was to prevent the 
bidder from controlling the company should he launch a successful takeover bid. 
The objective of the loan was to enable the trust to buy shares from the 
shareholders at the same price the bidder was proposing, if any shareholders felt 
aggrieved at having lost out on the opportunity to exit their investment. An action 
was brought by an affiliate of the potential bidder having acquired a nominal 
number of shares.  The court found that both the issuance of the shares and the 
loan were unlawful in the absence of explicit shareholder approval. Although the 
court found that the directors were acting in good faith in what they believed to be 
in the company’s best interests, and although the court accepted that formally the 
board had the power to issue the shares and make the loan, the court held that 
such actions amounted to illegitimate interference with the shareholders’ 
fundamental constitutional rights. The law did not ‘permit directors to exercise 
powers delegated to them […] in such a way as to interfere by the majority with the 
exercise of its constitutional rights’ (emphasis added). Constitutional rights were 
understood by the court to mean the right to non-interference with voting control 
and the right to non-interference with the decision as to whether or not to accept 
an offer for the shares. Such interference could only take place if the shareholders 
had explicitly authorised it. Furthermore, the Court explicitly noted that any 
reasons given for such actions, no matter how compelling and honestly believed, 
were ‘irrelevant’. 
In the early 1970s the Privy Counsel in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd, affirmed the position in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd. Although the case concerned 
the issue of shares to alter the control structure in the company, Lord Wilberforce 
made some important observations on the use of board power to interfere with a 
possible hostile bid: 
 
The right to dispose of shares at a given price is essentially an individual right 
to be exercised on individual decision and on which a majority, in the absence of 
                                                     
68 See The Savoy Hotel Limited and the Berkeley Hotel Company Limited: Investigation under Section 
165 (b) of the Companies Act, 1948: Report of E. Milner Holland (1954), 27. 
69 [1967] Ch. 254. 
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oppression or similar impropriety, is entitled to prevail. Directors are of course 
entitled to offer advice, and bound to supply information, relevant to the 
making of such a decision, but to use their fiduciary power solely for the 
purpose of shifting the power to decide to whom and at what price shares are 
to be sold cannot be related to any purpose for which the power over the share 
capital was conferred upon them (emphasis added).70 
 
For Lord Wilberforce the shareholder has a right to decide whether or not to sell 
his shares in response to a takeover offer, and the board has no authority to 
intentionally interfere with the exercise of that right. The delegation of power 
from the shareholders to the board to manage the company does not extend to 
the authority to take such action. For the board to be able to do so requires 
explicit (ex-ante or ex-post) shareholder approval. This is a general rule applicable to 
any exercise of corporate power. A small exception to this is noted by Lord 
Wilberforce, as it was in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd: such actions may be taken to 
prevent ‘oppression or similar impropriety’. 
The legal principle that powers must be used for purposes for which they are 
conferred was codified in section 171(b) of the Companies Act 2006 as a duty to 
use corporate powers for proper purposes. Its codification as a duty is somewhat 
peculiar as the cases which it codifies do not refer to it as a duty;71 it was not 
enforced derivatively but rather as a personal right;72 and the broad idea of using 
powers for proper purposes is not a standard-like starting point for the analysis,73 
but a basis for explaining a constitutional rule which sets forth a default division of 
power in relation to questions of voting control and hostile bids.  Importantly, its 
codification as a duty does not affect its straightforward rule-based characteristics: 
board action that intentionally interferes with voting control is unlawful without 
ex-ante or ex-post shareholder approval.  
Arguably in one important respect this rule is different than the non-
frustration principle in that it relies on the court to determine the purpose for 
which the action was taken. If the substantial purpose of the board action is not to 
interfere with the shareholders’ constitutional rights then the action is lawful. By 
contrast the non-frustration rule is a rule that prevents any action that could 
frustrate the bid (without shareholder approval) regardless of whether the board 
would wish to take such action for reasons unrelated to the bid. This is a 
distinction, however, of limited import. The most powerful defences such as 
poison pills do not have any non-defensive purpose and in relation to those that 
                                                     
70 [1974] 1 All ER, 1133. 
71 Some commentators view the doctrine as a sub duty of the duty of loyalty. See P. Davies, Gower and 
Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 2003). In our view this is incorrect. 
As the analysis below shows it is a doctrine based on the distribution of power in the corporation. Very 
few pre-2006 cases used the term duty to refer to the doctrine. See Re BSB Holdings Ltd (no.2) [1996] 1 
BCLC 155. Clearly the doctrine is elevated to a duty in The Companies Act 2006, s 171(b). 
72 See Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch. 254 and Re Sherborne Park residents Co Ltsd [1987] BCLC. 
73 Arguably it was in Howard Smith but not in any of the earlier cases.  
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do, for example share issues or asset sales, boards will struggle to persuade a court 
that sudden non-ordinary course transactions were taken for a ‘legitimate 
corporate purpose’ and that interference with the shareholder’s constitutional 
rights was only an ancillary effect.  
In our view the above analysis accurately reflects UK law today. However, 
there are two post-Howard Smith cases that arguable qualify the above position that 
need to be addressed. In the unreported High Court case of Cayne v Natural 
Resources,74 a case that involved the issue of shares that the plaintiffs claimed was 
aimed at influencing the result of a proxy contest, Vice Chancellor Megarry 
observed that the rule set forth in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd ‘must not be carried too 
far’. What Megarry VC meant by this statement is that the strictness of the rule 
should not be understood to prevent all board action taken to protect its 
shareholders. Whereas Hogg suggests that reasons for action are ‘irrelevant’, 
Megarry VC questions whether that is always the case.  The example that animates 
his observations is where a competitor of a company takes an equity position in 
the company for the sole purpose of damaging the company, in order to enhance 
its own competitive position. The law cannot, Megarry VC opines, require the 
board to remain passive where the company is threatened with being ‘reduced to 
impotence and beggary’.   
The second case is Criterion v Stratford Properties LLC.75 In this case the board 
of Criterion, in response to a rumoured bid from an unwanted predator, put in 
place a defensive amendment to its joint venture agreement with Stratford. The 
amendment provided that Criterion would buy-out Stratford at a guaranteed 25 
per cent premium if the defence was triggered. There were two triggers to the 
defence: either a successful takeover of the company (by any bidder); or the 
removal of the Chairman or CEO of the company.  The rumoured bid never 
materialised. However, at a subsequent date the defence was triggered as a result 
of the removal of the CEO, at which point Stratford brought an action to enforce 
their sell-out right. At first instance and the Court of Appeal the legal question was 
whether entering into such an arrangement was a lawful exercise of corporate 
power. The High Court held that the defensive arrangement was unlawful as it was 
so disproportionate to the purported threat. However, in holding that the board’s 
action was invalid Hart J suggested that UK company law might provide 
somewhat greater flexibility for boards to interfere with the shareholder right to 
accept or reject a takeover offer. Hart J at first instance, relying on Cayne v Natural 
Resources and a Canadian case,76 suggested that such action might be lawful if a 
reasonable director would view the ‘economic damage’ to the company as 
justifying the board’s actions. The Court of Appeal considered the case but 
refused to decide whether, and if so under what circumstances, board controlled 
defensive action could be lawful. In the Court of Appeal’s view if intentionally 
defensive measures were per se unlawful, then the actions in this case were 
                                                     
74 Unreported (Lexis). 
75 [2002] EWHC 496 (Ch). 
76 Teck Corporation v Millar [1972] 33 DLR (3d) 288. 
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necessarily unlawful, but even if such measures were lawful in theory, in this 
particular case the board’s actions were so disproportionate to the alleged threat 
that they could not plausibly have been taken in the corporate interest. 
Accordingly the Court of Appeal thought it was unnecessary in this case to decide 
whether defensive measures could ever be lawful. 77 
To what extent is the position set forth in Hogg v Cramphorn and Howard Smith 
altered by these cases? With regard to Cayne, one might ask whether ‘impotence 
and beggary’ differs in any significant respect from the ‘oppression and similar 
impropriety’ exception referred to in Howard Smith. Furthermore, Megarry VC in 
Cayne is really concerned that the strictures of the Hogg rule may prevent the 
company from protecting itself from extremely abusive minority shareholder 
behaviour. What he appears to forget however, is that the rule in Hogg permits 
shareholders by ordinary resolution to approve protective board action, which 
they surely would do in the circumstances he describes. Perhaps the protective 
rationale Megarry VC refers to would support board action where time is of the 
essence and where there may not be enough time to call a meeting. It is however 
difficult to imagine circumstances in the voting control context where such 
flexibility would be necessary and, it is submitted, impossible to imagine in the 
context of a hostile takeover offer taking place in accordance with the Takeover 
Panel’s process rules (assuming the non-application of rule 21).   
Criterion at first instance is a more difficult case for the position articulated in 
Hogg and Howard Smith as it clearly expands the scope for reason-based 
justifications for board action beyond ‘oppression and similar impropriety’. In our 
view the holding of this case is clearly inconsistent with authority: reasons for Hogg 
and Howard Smith were irrelevant. However, in the unlikely event that it finds 
                                                     
77 The case was appealed to the House of Lords; however, the House of Lords did not directly determine 
whether using corporate powers for defensive purposes was a proper corporate purpose. The House of 
Lords clearly places the question of the legitimacy of the action within the legal question of authority: did 
the board have authority to use corporate power in this way (see in particular Lord Scott of Foscote’s 
judgment)? The House of Lords held that the lower courts had not considered the issue of authority and 
directed them to do so. Whether this view of the lower courts judgments is correct is open to dispute. 
However, for our purposes what is important is that the House of Lord’s approach is consistent with the 
original understanding of the proper purpose doctrine as a rule setting forth the default constitutional 
division of power in relation to fundamental issues such as the interference with voting control or the 
right to decide on a takeover offer. However, the House of Lords took no position on the substantive 
question of when defences could be deployed without shareholder approval. One could argue that the 
very fact that the House of Lords referred the authority issue (whether apparent or ostensible) back to 
the lower courts is indicative of the House of Lords’ approval of the fact that defences may be deployed 
without shareholder approval. However, it is important to note that no UK court has said that board 
action can never, without shareholder approval, interfere with fundamental shareholder rights. Regarding 
actual authority Hogg v Cramphorn and Howard Smith both accept that the board may take such action to 
avoid ‘oppression or similar impropriety’. With regard to ostensible authority it is possible to envisage 
circumstances in which the board takes action to interfere with fundamental rights, but the third party is 
unaware of the voting control or takeover implications of the action, in which case the board would have 
ostensible authority to take the action. Accordingly, for both Hogg and Howard Smith it is possible that the 
board may have actual or ostensible authority, and therefore, no substantive implication can be read into 
the House of Lords’ authority direction. Our thanks to Edmund Schuster for discussion of this point. See 
Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28. 
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future fertile judicial sole it is submitted the scope for board action is very limited. 
The framework of analysis in Criterion is a rights-based framework or a power 
distribution framework: when can a threat justify interference with the shareholder 
right to decide to sell. It is a rights-based framework whose only UK judicial 
support is Cayne v Natural Resources. Accordingly, a reasonable director through the 
eyes of a UK court will require something close to impotence and beggary to 
justify defensive action, and as argued above, in the UK context it is difficult to 
imagine any such circumstances arising from a hostile bid governed by the 
Takeover Code. Accordingly, in relation to the limited defences which are formally 
available to boards of UK companies without requiring shareholder approval, such 
defences cannot be used in the UK without the board having obtained explicit 
authorisation from the shareholders to do so. The only notable difference with the 
non-frustration rule is that such approval can be given prior to the target board 
becoming aware of any bid.   
 
2.3 PRACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS  
 
An important distinction between company law’s regulation of takeover defences 
and the board neutrality rule is that it is possible under company law to make 
defences available to boards through ex-ante shareholder approval when no bid is 
on the horizon. Under the non-frustration rule only ex-post approval would allow 
the board to deploy the defence. This means that UK company law enables the 
attentive and informed shareholder to elect to take the risk that defences may be 
used to benefit management and not the shareholders. In any such shareholders’ 
view those risks would be outweighed by the potential benefits of defences.  Of 
course, this ex-ante flexibility also enables the board to take advantage of rationally 
apathetic or inattentive shareholders to obtain approval for the construction and 
deployment of defences without those shareholders having given considered 
thought to whether making them available is appropriate. There is some support 
from the United States to suggest that informed shareholders would take this 
risk,78 and strong evidence that they would be anything other than apathetic in the 
face of requests to approve them.79 We do not have space here to consider this 
debate in detail and refer the reader to discussion elsewhere.80 Here we are 
concerned with the scope for the board to use the defences made available by 
                                                     
78  See M. Klausner, ‘Institutional Investors, Private Equity and Anti-Takeover Protection at the IPO 
Stage’ (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 755, 760, detailing evidence that a significant 
majority of Private Equity firms who bring their portfolio companies to market ensure that those 
companies have a potent staggered board/poison pill defence in place (as poison pills can be adopted 
after a bidder approaches the company, in effect a company with a staggered board in the US always has 
a staggered board/poison pill combination).   
79 See Klausner, ibid, detailing the contemporary voting patterns when shareholders are asked to amend 
the charter to stagger the board. Based on a report from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(2001) Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Issues 5, Klausner observes that 59 per cent of 
institutional investors report that they vote against such proposals. 
80 See Kershaw, n 38 above. 
                 3/2011 
 
 24
shareholders to entrench themselves rather than for legitimate corporate or 
shareholder regarding objectives.  
A widely-held view within the European takeover debate is that if you make 
defences available to directors then most likely they will use them to further their 
own interests.81 However, the scope to use defences to further a manager’s own 
interests in clear disregard of the shareholders’ interests is a function of the 
broader corporate governance landscape in the applicable jurisdiction. As we 
observed in Section 1 above, the potency of a poison pill in the United States is 
dependent on the board being a staggered board. As the removal right for a 
staggered board is a with cause removal right, in order for a hostile bidder to 
obtain control over the board she must wait for two annual shareholder meetings 
– removing a third of the board at the first meeting and a third at the second. In 
the UK the mandatory removal right is a without cause right enabling the removal 
of the whole board at a single general meeting by simple majority vote and without 
any need to justify the removal.82 Furthermore, a general meeting can be swiftly 
called at any time upon the initiative of the shareholders themselves provided that 
a group of shareholders representing five per cent of the shareholder body 
requisitions the board to call a meeting.83 In many UK listed companies that 
would require the agreement of only two or three institutional shareholders.84 
Pursuant to UK company law such a meeting could be called within a minimum 
time period of 49 days.85 Accordingly, any board that refused to redeem a pill 
where the shareholders predominantly favoured the bid would be destined for 
swift removal in order to enable the bid to proceed. In the alternative a 
shareholder meeting could be called to instruct the board to remove the pill. Such 
an instruction would require a special resolution (75 per cent of the votes cast at 
the meeting) but given the low voting rates at general meetings in UK companies 
such a resolution could be passed with significantly less than 75 per cent of the 
outstanding shares.86  
In relation to other possible defences such as the issue of shares which 
benefit from rolling allotment and pre-emption right waiver approvals, or the use 
of an asset sale defence, the ability to replace the board to prevent the action or to 
instruct the board to desist from proceeding would be ineffective as the corporate 
action could be implemented before a meeting could be called.  However, the 
basic rule set of UK company law still operates as an important constraint on the 
use of such defences. Any deployment of defences against the wishes of the 
                                                     
81 See n 8 above.  
82 Companies Act 2006, s 168. 
83 ibid, s 303-305, as amended by The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) regulations 2009, no 1632.  
84 On shareholder ownership in the UK, see D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009), 171-175. 
85 Companies Act 2006, s 304(1), provides that the board must call the meeting within 21 days from the 
date the meeting was requisitioned and for a date not more that 28 days later. 
86 The Model Articles for Public Companies, art 4, provides an example of such an instruction right. 
Most listed companies provide for a similar instruction right.  
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majority of shareholders would risk subsequent removal by those shareholders. In 
contrast to the United States, in the UK the rules governing the removal of 
directors and the rules on the calling of shareholder meetings do not guarantee the 
board a period of time during which shareholder tempers can be cooled. 
Accordingly, in the UK not only do the use and, typically, the construction of 
takeover defences require shareholder approval, once made available the scope to 
deploy them for entrenchment purposes is very limited.  
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
 
The above analysis shows clearly that if the objective of the board neutrality rule is 
to protect shareholders from managerial abuse or to affirm their sovereignty it is 
of trivial consequence in the United Kingdom. Its absence would, however, open 
the door to the increased availability and use of board controlled takeover 
defences where shareholders ex-ante elect to make them available. Importantly, 
such defensive availability would be an exercise of shareholder sovereignty – one 
that the board neutrality rule denies them. Whether such an increase in the use of 
takeover defences would place additional sand in the wheels of the market for 
corporate control is unclear. On the one hand, where shareholders, having ex-ante 
elected to trust the board by empowering it to use defences, do not challenge their 
use when a bid materialises then this could inhibit transactions that would have 
happened but for the removal of the non-frustration rule. However, in the absence 
of those defences such shareholders would surely in any event have followed 
management’s lead and have rejected what the board told them was an 
inappropriate offer. On the other hand, where shareholders balk at the 
deployment of the defences they approved of ex ante, then directors, aware of the 
shareholder friendly context of UK corporate governance and the institutional 
structure of UK shareholder ownership, are unlikely to aggressively deploy those 
defences. If this analysis is correct the removal of the non-frustration rule and the 
possible (shareholder approved) increase in the availability of takeover defences 
would also have a trivial impact on activity levels in the market for corporate 
control.  
  
 
 
3. IS A BOARD NEUTRALITY RULE TRIVIAL FOR GERMAN 
COMPANIES? 
 
The central provision of German law addressing the problem of defensive 
measures adopted by the target’s management board is section 33 of the Securities 
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Acquisition and Takeover Act.87 The provision was adopted in 2001 and was not 
altered as a result of the implementation of the Takeover Directive.  
There were two primary drivers of the Act’s adoption. The first was the 
rejection of the proposal for a Takeover Directive by the European Parliament in 
2001. In anticipation of European legislation and in accordance with the Common 
Position for the Takeover Directive of 19 June 2000,88 which in turn was based on 
the UK Takeover Code,89 early drafts of the German law had contained a strict 
non-frustration requirement addressed at both the management and the 
supervisory board. Following the failure to adopt the proposed Directive, and with 
the future of the European initiative in doubt, the German legislature was 
unconstrained by European demands and became more susceptible to voices 
critical of a broad neutrality principal.90 The second driver of the Act’s adoption 
was that the German public’s view of board neutrality had soured after first 
proposals for the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act had been circulated, 
mainly as a result of the prolonged takeover battle between Vodafone and 
Mannesmann.91 
                                                     
87 Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, Law of 20 December 2001 (Federal Law Gazette I p 3822), 
as last amended by the Law of 30 July 2009 (Federal Law Gazette I p 2479), art 3. s 33 reads: ‘Actions of 
the Board of Management of the Target Company.  
(1) After publication of the decision to make an offer and until publication of the result pursuant to 
section 23(1) sentence 1 no. 2, the board of management of the target company may not take any actions 
which could prevent the success of the offer. This does not apply to actions which a prudent and 
conscientious manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid would have taken, to endeavour to 
find a competing offer, or to actions consented to by the supervisory board of the target company. 
(2) If the general meeting authorizes the board of management prior to the period referred to in 
subsection 1 sentence 1 to take actions falling within the competence of the general meeting in order to 
prevent the success of takeover bids, such actions shall be specified in detail in the authorization. The 
authorization may be granted for a maximum term of 18 months. The resolution by the general meeting 
requires a majority of at least three quarters of the share capital represented at the vote; the articles of 
association may provide for a larger majority and further requirements. Any actions by the board of 
management on the basis of an authorization pursuant to sentence 1 shall require the consent of the 
supervisory board.’ [Translation by BaFin.] 
88 Common Position (EC) No 1/2001 of 19 June 2000 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view 
to adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on company law concerning 
takeover bids. 2001 OJ C 23/1. 
89 For the text of the German draft version, see L. Röh in W. Haarmann and M. Schüppen (eds), 
Frankfurter Kommentar zum Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Recht und 
Wirtschaft, 3rd ed, 2008), s 33/6. 
90 In particular, trade unions and some industrial undertakings voiced concerns, see H. Krause and T. 
Pötzsch in H.D. Assmann, T. Pötzsch, and U.H. Schneider (eds), Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz 
(Cologne: Otto Schmidt, 2005), s 33/17. 
91 After eventual adoption of the Directive, companies were given the option of electing the more 
restrictive European neutrality rule (Takeover Directive, art 9) by resolution of the general meeting and 
amendment of the articles. See Securities Acquisitions and Takeover Act, s 33a (the Directive requires 
that companies be given the opt-in if the Member State does not provide for a mandatory non-frustration 
principle). See the Takeover Directive, art 12(2). Furthermore, as permitted by the Directive, art 12(3), 
the German Act contains a reciprocity rule which provides that the general meeting of a company that 
has adopted the stricter neutrality rule may resolve that these rules shall not apply if the company 
becomes the target of a bidder that does not operate under corresponding restrictions. s 33c. In that case, 
the default rule of s 33 governs the takeover. The European breakthrough (Takeover Directive, art 11) is 
also contained as an opt-in in the German Act, s 33b. 
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Section 33 prohibits target board defensive action that has not been approved 
by the shareholders. Approval may be given ex-ante, for a period of up to 18 
months prior to the commencement of the bid.92 However, this broad prohibition 
is effectively nullified by several exceptions contained in section 33. The 
management board may take actions that are outside the normal course of 
business without authorisation by the general meeting, even if they have not yet 
been partly or fully implemented, provided that ‘a prudent and conscientious 
manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid would have taken’ the same 
action.93 More importantly, defensive action is permissible if consented to by the 
supervisory board of the target.94 The board neutrality rule only applies to the 
management board,95 which has sole responsibility under German law to manage 
the company.96 However, members of the management board and the supervisory 
board are subject to similar conflicts of interest in a takeover situation: both have 
private benefits of control that are placed in play by the hostile bid. Translated 
into the unitary board context, consisting of executive and independent non-
executive directors, the effect of the exception is to allow for board controlled 
defensive measures when the board elects to deploy them. 
Accordingly, as has been acknowledged in the literature, the German 
legislature attached greater importance to the autonomy of directors to assess 
whether a bid is in the interest of the company and all affected stakeholders, than 
to the interests of the shareholders in controlling the use of takeover defences.97 
This is in line with the philosophy underlying directors’ duties in the German 
stock corporation. While the Stock Corporation Act is silent on the question of in 
whose interests directors shall act, the relevant provisions98 are commonly 
interpreted as requiring the management board to consider the interests of the 
shareholders, employees, and society at large.99 Furthermore, there is no order of 
priority in relation to these interests. Rather, the board is expected to decide on a 
                                                     
92 Securities Acquisitions and Takeover Act, s 33(1) sentence 1, s 33(2). 
93 ibid, s 33(1), sentence 2. 
94 ibid. This exception was included in the last stages of the legislative procedure, after the draft Takeover 
Directive had been rejected in the European Parliament. See H. Krause and T. Pötzsch in Assmann, et al 
(eds), n 90 above, s 33/17. 
95 s 33(1), sentence 1. 
96 Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), Law of 6 September 1965 (Federal Law Gazette I p 1089), as 
last amended by Art 1of the Law of 31 July 2009 (Federal Law Gazette I p 2509), s 76. 
97 Röh, n 89 above, s 33/2. 
98 In particular the Stock Corporation Act, s 76(1).  
99 The Stock Corporation Act 1937, s 70(1), contained an express provision to the effect that the 
management board shall manage the company ‘for the benefit of the undertaking and its employees and 
as the common good of the people and the Reich requires’. Not only because of its political undertones, 
but also because the legislature believed that the social obligations of management were self-evident and 
that an explicit provision was, therefore, unnecessary, this formulation was left out when the Stock 
Corporation Act was reformed in 1965. See W. Hefermehl and G. Spindler in B. Kropff and J. Semler 
(eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich: Beck, 2d ed, 2004), vol 3, s 76/53. 
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case-by-case basis and is accorded discretion as to how to reconcile the interests 
where they conflict.100 
The change in the German Government’s stance towards the neutrality rule, 
and the contentious nature of the political and legal debate101 leading up to the 
enactment of Section 33 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, suggests 
that the decision as to whether to adopt or reject the board neutrality rule 
mattered to the defensive capability of the management boards of German stock 
corporations. Below, following the structure adopted in the other sections of this 
article, we ask whether this is the case. 
 
3.1 FORMAL AVAILABILITY 
 
3.1.1 A German poison pill? 
Shareholder rights plans are not a common takeover defence in Germany. One 
possible reason for this is that they are not necessary. The German corporate 
landscape is characterised by large block holdings and cross shareholdings, which 
insulate many companies from hostile takeovers. In addition, until the reforms of 
1998,102 shares with multiple voting rights and voting caps were permitted, further 
stifling the market for corporate control.103 However, notwithstanding these 
structural impediments to hostile takeovers, another reason why shareholder rights 
plans have not featured prominently in Germany is because the legislative 
environment regarding the issuance of naked warrants104 is less flexible than in the 
United States, and the freedom of contract required to fashion effective poison 
pills is more restricted. 
Dividend payments can, in general, only be made on the basis of a 
shareholder resolution deciding on the appropriation of the balance sheet profit.105 
As an exception, the management board may be authorised in the articles to make 
an advance payment. However, such authority is subject to several restrictions. 
First, the payment can only be made after the close of the business year and only if 
the preliminary annual accounts show a profit for that business year.106 Secondly, 
the dividend must not exceed half of the current annual profit and of the balance 
sheet profit of the previous year.107 Thirdly, the declaration of the dividend must 
                                                     
100 ibid. The rejection of a monistic view of the corporation with the shareholders at its epicentre is 
reinforced by the German Constitution, art 14(2), which provides that ‘property entails obligations’ and 
that ‘its use shall serve the public good’. Sozialbindung des Eigentums. 
101 See T. Pötzsch in Assmann, et al (eds), n 90 above, Einl. 27. 
102 Law of 27 April 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I p 786) (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich). 
103 Multiple voting rights are now generally prohibited for the stock corporation in the Stock Corporation 
Act, s 12(2), and voting caps for public companies in s 134(1).  
104 A naked warrant is a warrant that is issued without an accompanying bond. 
105 Stock Corporation Act, s 174. 
106 ibid, s 59(2). 
107 ibid. 
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be approved by the supervisory board.108 Fourthly, the law generally envisages 
payment of dividends in cash. Dividends in kind are (now)109 permitted if the 
articles so provide, but again it is necessary to procure a resolution of the general 
meeting to authorise this.110 Thus, as compared to other countries, for example the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the issuing of warrants as a dividend is 
cumbersome, and the management board has limited flexibility in terms of 
timing.111 
These dividend restrictions notwithstanding, the objective of a poison pill can 
theoretically be achieved by means of naked warrants or convertible bonds. 
However, the use of both devices as takeover defences is problematic. In contrast 
to UK law, the German Stock Corporation Act provides for several 
comprehensively regulated forms of capital increase that follow (partially) distinct 
rules. The law envisages as the regular form of capital raising the increase of 
capital against contributions.112 This terminology is somewhat misleading because 
other types of capital increase, namely contingent and authorised capital,113 also 
require the subscribers to make contributions. The distinctive feature of a capital 
increase against contributions is that the capital increase has to be carried out 
‘without undue delay’.114 It becomes effective once the requested contribution has 
been paid up,115 and the capital increase is registered in the register of 
companies.116 Authorised capital, on the other hand, allows the management 
board greater flexibility in deciding about the timing and conditions of the capital 
increase. The management board can be granted authorisation in the articles for a 
period of not more than five years to issue and allot shares and determine whether 
pre-emptive rights should be excluded.117 In that case, the amended articles need 
to be registered in the register of companies,118 but the capital increase is not 
effective, and contributions do not need to be paid up, until the management 
board decides to issue the new shares.119 Finally, contingent capital can be created 
by resolution of the general meeting for the purpose of meeting conversion or 
subscription rights of holders of convertible bonds, preparing for a merger, or 
                                                     
108 ibid, s 59(2), (3). 
109 Amendment of the Stock Corporation Act by Law of 19 July 2002 (Transparenz- und 
Publizitätsgesetz), Federal Law Gazette I p 2681. 
110 Stock Corporation Act, s 58(5). 
111 For this reason, the practical relevance of ibid, s 59 is insignificant. See C. Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht 
(Munich: Beck, 22nd ed, 2009), s 30/21. 
112 Stock Corporation Act, ss 182-191. 
113 The rules on the contingent capital increase are laid down in the Stock Corporation Act, ss 192-201; 
those on the authorised capital in ibid, ss 202-206. The fourth, and last, form of capital increase is an 
increase from the company’s reserves. ibid, ss 207-220. It is not relevant for our purposes. For an 
overview in English, see G. Wirth, M. Arnold, R. Morshäuser, and M. Greene, Corporate Law in Germany 
(Munich: Beck, 2nd ed, 2010), 173-189. 
114 Imperial Court (RG), RGZ 144, 138, 141-142. 
115 The requested contribution must be at least one quarter of the par value plus the premium in full. 
Stock Corporation Act, ss 36(2), 36a. 
116 ibid, ss 188, 189. 
117 ibid, s 203(2). 
118 ibid, s 181. 
119 ibid, ss 203(1), 189. 
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granting subscription rights to employees and members of the management of the 
company.120 This list is exhaustive.121 Once provided for in the articles, the capital 
increase is contingent on the actual exercise of the conversion or subscription 
rights by the holders of the rights.122 
Accordingly, pursuant to German corporate law contingent capital is required 
in relation to warrants, but the contingent capital provisions only contemplate the 
use of naked warrants as a means of performance-based remuneration for 
employees and managers of the company.123 Lower courts and commentators 
addressing the issue have concluded that it is not legally possible for the company 
to issue naked warrants in other cases.124 As currently regulated in the Act, stock 
options for employees and management are not suitable as a defensive measure. 
Their volume is restricted to 10 per cent of the company’s share capital,125 and the 
law now provides for a minimum holding period of four years.126 In any event, 
their issuance requires a resolution of the general meeting adopted by a qualified 
majority (majority of not less than 75 per cent of the legal capital present and 
voting).127 
In theory some of these restrictions could be circumvented by a carefully 
structured convertible bond which has attached warrants issued to the existing 
shareholders. The issuance of convertible bonds involves a similar procedure to that 
of warrants. It must be based on a resolution of the general meeting adopted by a 
qualified majority.128 The general meeting can authorise the management board to 
issue the convertible bonds with attached warrants for a period of not more than 
five years.129After issuance (and usually expiration of a period of time specified in 
the bond indenture) the warrants can be separated from the bonds and traded 
independently. The capital underlying the warrants can be provided as contingent 
capital, which again requires a resolution of the general meeting adopted by a 
qualified majority.130 The volume of the contingent capital (and accordingly, 
therefore, that of the subscription rights) is limited to half of the company’s share 
capital.131 In theory, therefore it would be possible to place a significant number of 
                                                     
120 ibid, s 192(2). 
121 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (Munich: Beck, 9th ed, 2010), s 192/8. 
122 Stock Corporation Act, s 200. 
123 ibid, s 192(2) no 3.  
124 For references see A. Fuchs in Kropff and Semler (eds), n 99 above, vol 6, s 192/48; Hüffer, n 121 
above, s 221/75. 
125 Stock Corporation Act, s 192(3). 
126 ibid, s 193(2) no 4. For more details on stock options as a defensive measure see H. Krause, ‘Die 
Abwehr feindlicher Übernahmeangebote auf der Grundlage von Ermächtigungsbeschlüssen der 
Hauptversammlung’ (2002) Betriebs-Berater (BB) 1053, 1060 (coming to the same conclusion as here, 
namely that stock options are not effective as a defensive measure). 
127 Stock Corporation Act, s 193(1). 
128 ibid, s 221(1). The articles may reduce the majority requirement from 75 per cent to simple majority.  
129 ibid, s 221(2). 
130 ibid, s 192(2) no 1. Theoretically, s 182 (capital increase against contributions) or s 202 (authorised 
capital) also constitute possible methods to create the underlying capital, but they are less convenient (see 
Hüffer, n 121 above, s 221/59). All three methods require a shareholder resolution. 
131 Stock Corporation Act, s 192(3). 
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warrants in circulation through a nominally priced convertible bond, say one cent 
per bond, to be purchased by the existing shareholders.132 However, in order to be 
convertible into shares the conversion price would also have to be nominal in such 
a case. While the management board has discretion to determine the terms and 
conditions of the bond, which would include the triggers to being able to exercise 
the warrants,133 the conversion price must be fixed by the general meeting in the 
resolution that creates the underlying capital.134 Companies usually either specify a 
minimum price (floor) or a maximum markdown. This is considered to be in 
accordance with the requirements of the Stock Corporation Act by most, but not 
all commentators and courts.135 Notwithstanding the legality of such a resolution, 
the low floor would alert shareholders to the intention of the management board 
to deploy a takeover defence as the nominal bond could not serve any other 
function. In addition, convertible bonds, even if nominally priced, are of course 
not simply issued to a passive third party; rather they require an active contracting 
party.136 Thus, management must be able to muster sufficient enthusiasm from 
shareholders to actually subscribe for a large number of bonds. In consequence, 
nominal convertible bonds with warrants cannot be put in place without both ex 
ante shareholder approval, with shareholders being fully aware of the intention of 
the management board to use the bond as a poison pill, and the willingness by a 
significant number of shareholders to actively purchase the bonds and detachable 
warrants. 
An alternative way in which management could put in place a device that 
resembles a poison pill is to issue an ordinary convertible bond and to include in 
the bond’s terms and conditions a change of control clause that may provide, for 
example, for an adjustment of the conversion price where a bidder acquires a 
specified percentage of the target’s capital. Theoretically, the management board 
could also structure the bond in a way that makes it effectively redeemable, for 
example by retaining discretion as to whether and to what extent to adjust the 
conversion price. Such convertible bonds (without the redemption option) have in 
fact been put in place in the recent past. They were ostensibly issued for financing 
purposes and have neither been tested as a takeover defence in an actual bid nor 
challenged by dissenting shareholders.137 A suspicion remains, however, that they 
were used for defensive purposes.138 The change of control clauses usually provide 
for staggered adjustments, for example a reduction of the conversion price by 25 
                                                     
132 We stress the nominal nature of the bond as shareholders are unlikely to authorise the issue of 
convertible bonds to a third party that contains potentially dilutive warrants, but at the same time 
shareholders may not wish to use their capital to purchase a non-nominal corporate bond. 
133 Unless the terms have been laid down in the resolution of the general meeting pursuant to the Stock 
Corporation Act, s 221(1), which is permitted but not required, see O. Seiler in G. Spindler and E. Stilz 
(eds), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich: Beck, 2007), vol 2, s 221/59. 
134 Stock Corporation Act, s 193(2) no 3. 
135 See O. Rieckers in Spindler and Stilz (eds), n 133 above, s 193/14 for references. 
136 Creation follows civil law. See Civil Code, s 793. 
137 See J. Freiherr v. Falkenhausen and H. v. Klitzing, ‘Wandelanleihen als Poison Pill’ (2006) 27 Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1513, for examples. 
138 ibid. 
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per cent if the change of control occurs within one year after issuance, by 19 per 
cent during the second year, 12 per cent during the third year, six per cent in the 
fourth year, and no reduction thereafter.139 This contractual arrangement is 
functionally identical to a poison pill because the bidder’s holding – assuming he 
did not participate in the convertible bond issue on a pro-rata basis at an earlier 
date – is diluted significantly if a sufficient number of bondholders exercise their 
conversion right and the reduction of the conversion price is substantial.  
However, the discretion of the management board and the scope of possible 
reductions of the conversion price are restricted by the requirement that the 
(reduced) price must continue to be above the minimum which is set in the 
shareholder resolution authorising the issue of the bonds.140 Subject to this 
requirement, shareholders could in theory authorise the directors to issue a 
convertible bond that could subsequently be subject to a dilutive conversion price 
set by management (without the shareholders explicitly consenting to any 
reductions in the conversion price). However, if issued to anyone other than the 
shareholders themselves, in contrast to a poison pill, the benefits would accrue to 
the third party creditors and not the shareholders. For that reason it seems highly 
unlikely that it could be used by managers as a defence unless the managers 
persuade the shareholders to put the pill in place by buying the bonds themselves. 
If they were to do so that would amount in effect to explicit ex-ante approval for 
the defence. Furthermore, any attempt to issue such bonds to third parties would 
be subject to significant restrictions imposed by the regulation of pre-emption 
rights. 
According to the Stock Corporation Act, shareholders have pre-emption 
rights not only in share issues, but also when convertible bonds are issued.141 
Consequently, shareholders must approve both the issue of the bond and the 
waiver of the pre-emption rights.142 The waiver requires a majority of at least 75 
per cent of the votes cast, even if the articles provide for a lower majority for the 
issuance of the bond.143 In addition, two further pre-emption right restrictions are 
applicable. First, the intention to exclude the pre-emption rights must be disclosed 
in the form prescribed in the statute, and management must prepare a report for 
the general meeting describing the reasons for the exclusion.144 Second, the 
resolution is voidable if the issue price is ‘inadequately low’.145 What is inadequate 
                                                     
139 ibid, 1514. 
140 ibid, 1518. 
141 s 221(4). 
142 Shareholders may either wave the pre-emption rights themselves in the resolution approving the bond 
issue or authorise the management board to do so (analogy to Stock Corporation Act, s 203(2)). See 
Federal Court of Justice (BGH) AG 2007, 863; Higher Regional Court (OLG) München, AG 1994, 372, 
373; OLG München, AG 1991, 210, 211. 
143 Stock Corporation Act, ss 221(4), 186(3). 
144 ibid, ss 221(4), 186(4), 121(4). 
145 ibid, s 255(2). See U. Hüffer in Kropff and Semler (eds), n 99 above, vol 7, s 255/10; M. Schwab in K. 
Schmidt and M. Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz (Cologne: Otto Schmidt, 2008), vol 2, s 255/9 (discussing and 
confirming the applicability of the Stock Corporation Act, s 255 in this case). 
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is not defined in generally applicable quantitative parameters but depends on the 
circumstances of each case and the interests of the company.146 The provision is 
phrased in sufficiently general terms to allow some deviation from the stock 
market price of the company’s shares or the company’s ‘true’ value according to 
the fundamentals. However, this requirement would prohibit discounts of the 
magnitude common in US-style poison pills, undermining the potency of this 
defence.147 Furthermore, while the management board has some discretion to 
determine what is in the best interest of the company,148 the resolution authorising 
the non pre-emptive convertible bond issue will most likely not withstand judicial 
scrutiny if the guiding consideration was the entrenchment of the members of the 
management board.  
 
3.1.2 Equity restructuring 
As far as the restructuring defence is concerned, German law is again more 
restrictive than US or UK law, although the difference is less pronounced with 
respect to the United Kingdom due to the harmonising influence of European 
law. As discussed, interim dividends are prohibited, and ordinary dividends require 
shareholder approval. Share buy-backs must generally be authorised by the 
shareholders.149 Authorisation can be given for a maximum of five years by 
resolution adopted with a simple majority. The resolution can, but does not need 
to, delineate the purpose of the authorisation.150 If the shareholders grant 
unlimited authorisation for a lengthy period of time it is therefore conceivable that 
the management board will later make use of its powers to defend against a hostile 
bid that the shareholders did not envisage at the time of authorisation and which is 
viewed favourably by the shareholders. However, the effectiveness of authorised 
share buy-backs as a takeover defence is limited because their volume is restricted 
                                                     
146 Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 71, 40, 51 (Kali und Salz); Higher Regional Court (OLG) Jena, 
AG 2007, 31, 35. See also W. Bayer, ‘Kapitalerhöhung mit Bezugsrechtsausschluss und Vermögensschutz 
der Aktionäre nach § 255 Abs. 2 AktG’ (1999) 163 Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 
(ZHR) 505, 523-543; Hüffer, n 121 above, s 255/5; T. Johannsen-Roth and S. Goslar, ‘Rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen für Übernahmeprämien bei Misch- oder Tauschangeboten im Lichte von § 255 
Abs. 2 Satz 1 AktG und § 57 AktG’ (2007) Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 573, 575-579; W. Zöllner in W. 
Zöllner (ed), Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1985), vol 2, s 255/10 
(discussing among other things the question whether the importance of the new shareholder for the 
company and the contribution to be made are relevant for the determination of ‘adequacy’ within the 
meaning of the Stock Corporation Act, s 255(2)). 
147 See, eg, Fuchs, n 124 above, s 193/16, who argues that a five per cent discount to the current stock 
market price is still permissible. 
148 See, eg, Higher Regional Court (OLG) Jena, AG 2007, 31, 35; Johannsen-Roth and Goslar, n 146 
above, 578. 
149 Stock Corporation Act, s 71(1) no 8. 
150 Regional Court (LG) Berlin, AG 2000, 328, 329 (Bankgesellschaft Berlin). But see also Higher Regional 
Court (OLG) München, AG 2003, 163-164 (holding that the resolution is voidable if there is no 
conceivable legally permissible purpose for which the authorisation could be used, for example because 
the company is indebted to an extent that will prevent it from forming the reserve required for the 
purchase according to the Stock Corporation Act, s 71(2)). For further discussion of this point and 
references, see H. Merkt in K.J. Hopt and H. Wiedemann (eds), Aktiengesetz Großkommentar (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 4th ed, 2008), vol 2, s 71/266. 
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to 10 per cent of the company’s legal capital.151 It may, of course, be a useful 
device if combined with other defences, for example the placement of a block of 
shares with a friendly third party. 
The statute allows for limited exceptions for management to effect a buy-
back without shareholder approval. The most relevant in this context provides 
that the company can purchase its own shares where this is ‘necessary in order to 
prevent the company from suffering severe and imminent damage’.152 It is not 
clear if or when a hostile takeover can pose a ‘severe and imminent’ danger. The 
courts have not yet dealt with the issue. Commentators agree that the provision 
should be interpreted restrictively.153 Most notably, a danger must exist for the 
company, ie, it must be shown that there is an immediate risk to the impairment of 
the company’s assets. The intention of the bidder to squeeze out minority 
shareholders or lay off parts of the workforce does not give rise to the threat of 
‘imminent damage’ unless there is a clear risk that the restructuring will lead to a 
substantial financial loss for the company, for example because the bidder seeks to 
loot the target.154 A large part of the literature rejects the right of the management 
board to purchase the company’s own shares even in such a case.155 In any event, 
the restriction on the volume of share buy-backs mentioned in the previous 
paragraph also applies to a buy-back to avert imminent danger.156 
More potent as a defensive measure than share buy-backs are increases of the 
company’s share capital and the placement of a block of shares with a friendly 
third party. An overview of the different forms of capital increase in the Stock 
Corporation Act was given above.157 The method offering the most flexibility to 
management, and hence the most relevant for our purposes, is authorised 
capital.158 Pursuant to the respective provisions, the articles of association can 
authorise the management board for a period of up to five years to increase the 
share capital by an amount specified in the authorisation.159 If the general meeting 
resolves to grant the authorisation after formation of the company, the resolution 
to amend the articles must be adopted by a majority of 75 per cent.160 The volume 
of the authorised capital is limited to one-half of the company’s existing legal 
capital,161 but this would clearly be sufficient to defend effectively against a large 
number of takeovers. Furthermore, the shareholder resolution can authorise the 
                                                     
151 Stock Corporation Act, s 71(1) no 8. 
152 ibid, s 71(1) no 1. 
153 See Merkt, n 150 above, s 71/159 for references. 
154 See, for example, Hüffer, n 121 above, s 71/9 with references. 
155 See Merkt, n 150 above, s 71/181 for references. 
156 Stock Corporation Act, s 71(2). 
157 See n 112 above and accompanying text. 
158 Stock Corporation Act, ss 202-206. 
159 ibid, s 202(1). 
160 ibid, s 202(2). 
161 ibid, s 202(3). 
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board to exclude shareholders’ pre-emption rights.162 With the consent of the 
supervisory board, the management board is empowered to determine the rights 
attached to the newly issued shares, provided that the resolution of the general 
meeting does not contain specific instructions in this regard.163  
Since authorised capital is widely used in practice, and shareholder resolutions 
typically authorise the exclusion of pre-emption rights, the management board is 
largely unconstrained by the Stock Corporation Act in issuing shares to a friendly 
third party to frustrate a takeover bid. Of course, shareholders concerned about 
managers abusing such authorisation in a hostile context could impose conditions 
on the authorisation.164 Save such a limitation, the only substantive constraint 
imposed on the board’s discretion by the Act is the requirement that the issue 
price of the new shares should not be ‘inadequately low’ if pre-emption rights are 
entirely or partially excluded.165 However, what the Stock Corporation Act says, or 
does not say, is not the end of this story. 
 
3.1.3 Additional requirements for the exclusion of pre-emption rights 
In addition to the express requirements for the exclusion of pre-emption rights 
laid down in the Stock Corporation Act, the courts have developed unwritten 
substantive requirements to which a resolution of the general meeting and (in the 
case of authorised capital) the subsequent decision of the management board to 
make a non-pre-emptive issue must conform. These requirements apply both to 
the exclusion of pre-emption rights in the context of a share issue and an issue of 
convertible bonds.166 They stem from a famous line of cases decided by the 
Federal Court of Justice over the course of 20 years towards the end of the last 
century.167 The relevant criteria have changed over time, but the doctrine is now 
well developed and can readily be summarised. In the first of these cases, Kali und 
Salz, which did not deal with authorised capital but a regular capital increase 
against contributions approved by resolution of the general meeting,168 the Court 
                                                     
162 ibid, s 203(2). The exclusion requires the consent of the supervisory board. Additional formal 
requirements are contained in ibid, ss 203(2), 186(4). 
163 ibid, s 204(1). 
164 F. Wamser in Spindler and Stilz (eds), n 133 above, s 202/83. 
165 Stock Corporation Act, s 255(2). For the applicability of s 255(2) when the general meeting authorises 
management to increase the share capital and allot shares pursuant to ibid, s 202, but the authorisation 
does not specify the minimum issue price, see Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 136, 133, 141 
(Siemens/Nold); Higher Regional Court (OLG) Karlsruhe, AG 2003, 444, 447; Higher Regional Court 
(KG) Berlin, ZIP 2007, 1660, 1662; Hüffer, n 145 above, s 255/13; E. Stilz in Spindler and Stilz (eds), n 
133 above, s 255/6-11. For the requirement that shares be issued at ‘the best possible’ or at least an 
‘adequate’ price where the capital increase is effected pursuant to the Stock  Corporation Act, s 182, 
under exclusion of pre-emption rights and the general meeting has not specified the issue price, see 
Hüffer, n 145 above, s 255/12; H. Wiedemann in Hopt and Wiedemann (eds), n 150 above, vol 6, 
s 182/68; Zöllner, n 146 above, s 255/12. 
166 Higher Regional Court (OLG) München, AG 1994, 372, 374; OLG Frankfurt a.M., AG 1992, 271; 
OLG München, AG 1991, 210, 211. 
167 BGHZ 71, 40 (Kali und Salz); 83, 319 (Holzmann); 136, 133 (Siemens/Nold). For an application of the 
principles in the more recent case law, see in particular BGHZ 164, 241 (Mangusta/Commerzbank I); 
BGHZ 164, 249 (Mangusta/Commerzbank II). 
168 Stock Corporation Act, s 182. 
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held that the exclusion of pre-emption rights was only valid if it was justified by 
objective requirements in the interest of the company. The test required the 
management board to balance the conflicting interests of shareholders and the 
company and determine that the exclusion was proportionate, that is, suitable and 
necessary in light of the board’s objectives in issuing the shares.169 
This test was applied by the Court to a capital increase in the form of 
authorised capital and an authorisation to exclude shareholders’ pre-emption rights 
a few years later in Holzmann. The Court adopted a strict stance and emphasised 
that the Kali und Salz standard operated at two levels in the case of authorised 
capital. First, the management board was under an obligation to examine whether 
the exclusion of pre-emption rights was an ‘adequate and the most suitable means 
to pursue preponderant interests of the company’ at the time when it wanted to 
make use of the authorisation.170 Second, at the time of adoption of the resolution 
the management board had to provide the general meeting with specific facts 
pointing to the possibility that it will in the future become necessary to allot shares 
non-pre-emptively.171 If no such development could be foreseen the authorisation 
would be voidable.172 In particular, it was not sufficient to adopt a boilerplate 
resolution, for example one that authorised management to exclude pre-emption 
rights whenever this was necessary ‘to prevent the company from suffering 
damage’.173 
In Siemens/Nold, a case that was first referred to the ECJ,174 the German 
Federal Court of Justice acknowledged that the Holzmann requirements were not 
practicable in the case of authorised capital. In order to give the management 
board flexibility to react quickly to new developments in the capital markets and 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the company not to disclose confidential 
information, it allowed the board to describe the purpose of the capital increase 
and the parameters of the authorisation in abstract terms.175 The court observed 
further that at the time of allotment of the shares and exclusion of the pre-
                                                     
169 BGHZ 71, 40, 46. The Court developed this doctrine from older case law that had allowed the 
management board to exclude pre-emption rights and allot shares to particular shareholders to defend 
against a hostile takeover where the bidder had the intention to break up the company. See BGHZ 33, 
175 (Minimax II). Thus, the creation of voting majorities as a takeover defence is not per se 
impermissible; however, the crucial question is whether the management board can use authorised capital 
to make its own assessment of whether the takeover constitutes a threat to the company or whether that 
authority lies ultimately with the general meeting. It is submitted that the latter is the case, as the 
discussion in the next paragraphs will show. 
170 BGHZ 83, 319, 321. 
171 ibid, 322. 
172 If the general meeting excludes the pre-emption rights in the resolution authorising management to 
allot shares, which is permissible pursuant to the Stock Corporation Act, ss 203(1), 186(4), the Court held 
that the facts provided by the management had to be sufficiently specific so as to enable the general 
meeting to balance the interests of shareholders and the company and assess the proportionality of means 
(exclusion of pre-emption rights) and purpose conclusively already at the time of the adoption of the 
resolution. BGH AG 1995, 227, 228 (Siemens AG). 
173 BGHZ 83, 319, 327. 
174 Case C-42/95 Siemens AG v Henry Nold [1996] ECR I-6017. 
175 BGHZ 136, 133, 136-140. 
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emption rights the management board had to assess carefully whether the specific 
circumstances that had prompted the board to make use of the authorisation were 
in conformity with the abstract parameters laid down in the resolution, and 
whether the share allotment was in the best interest of the company.176 Thus, the 
strict Holzmann standard was modified by the Court.  
However, this does not mean that the management board has unfettered 
discretion to use the authorisation as it considers appropriate. The courts continue 
to require that the board disclose the transaction or type of transaction it intends 
to pursue or business policy it wishes to implement by means of the capital 
increase.177 The disclosure must be sufficiently precise to set limits to the board’s 
discretion against which the legality of the share allotment and exclusion of pre-
emption rights can be measured.178 Accordingly, a statement holding that the 
capital increase was necessary ‘in order to enable the company in the course of a 
new business strategy to acquire shareholdings and/or trademarks and/or licences 
and/or other assets [...] and to allow partners of strategic importance to acquire 
holdings in the company [...]’ without specifying what the new business strategy 
consisted of, was too broad to pass the (modified) test of the Federal Court of 
Justice.179 
The legislature reacted to the restrictive approach of the Kali und Salz and 
Holzmann decisions by inserting a safe harbour into the Stock Corporation Act.180 
The requirement to balance the interests of shareholders and the company, or to 
show any grounds for justification of the exclusion of preemption rights, does, 
generally,181 not apply if four conditions are met: (1) The shares are issued for 
contributions in cash, not in kind; (2) the capital increase does not exceed 10 per 
cent of the company’s share capital; (3) a stock market price exists for the 
shares;182 and (4) the issue price is not significantly below that stock market price. 
However, it should be noted that only the requirements of Kali und Salz and its 
progeny (so-called materielle Beschlusskontrolle) are inapplicable. Other obligations 
stemming from fiduciary duties or the equal treatment principle continue to 
constrain the discretion of the directors.183 In addition, the restriction to capital 
increases not exceeding 10 per cent of the share capital limits the effectiveness of 
the provision as a takeover defence. 
                                                     
176 ibid, 139. 
177 In Siemens/Nold, the capital increase was intended to enable the company ‘to acquire shareholdings in 
particular, suitable cases’. The Court accepted this statement as sufficient justification for the 
authorisation. ibid, 134-135. 
178 Higher Regional Court (OLG) München, AG 2003, 451, 452 (MHM Mode Holding AG). 
179 ibid. 
180 Law of 2 August 1994 (Federal Law Gazette I p 1961) (Gesetz für kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur 
Deregulierung des Aktienrechts), art 1, amending the Stock Corporation Act, s 186(3), and inserting 
sentence 4. For the reasons of the amendment see the explanatory memorandum of the draft law, 
Bundestags-Drucksache 12/6721, 10 (emphasising the need to facilitate capital-raising and avoid 
disadvantages for German companies compared to companies governed by legal systems that provide for 
more flexibility). 
181 For exceptions, see Hüffer, n 121 above, s 186/39g with references. 
182 However, the provision does not require that the shares trade on a regulated market. 
183 See W. Servatius in Spindler and Stilz (eds), n 133 above, s 186/61 and the discussion at s 3.2 below. 
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For our purposes, the following conclusions can be drawn. If the 
management board has been authorised to issue shares (exceeding 10 per cent of 
the company’s share capital) and exclude pre-emption rights, for example, to 
finance acquisitions, it is not at a later point entitled to allot the shares to a friendly 
third party in order to frustrate a hostile bid. Furthermore, if the board expects the 
company to become the target of a takeover offer and contemplates using 
additional equity to defend against the bid, it must disclose this objective to the 
general meeting. There are good reasons to assume that an authorisation that does 
not go beyond general phrases such as a reference to ‘the interests of the 
company’, or the declared intention to be able to react to ‘new developments in 
the market’ will fail the Court’s test. Thus, even though the law does not provide 
for ex-post shareholder approval of share issues if the general meeting has created 
authorised capital and waived pre-emption rights, the courts have created duties 
that effectively ensure that the shareholders retain a modicum of control after they 
have granted authorisation.184 It should also be noted that these requirements 
                                                     
184 This also seems to be the opinion of the practice in Germany, as illustrated by the recent takeover 
battle between Hochtief AG and the Spanish construction group ACS. ACS acquired a holding of about 
25 per cent in Hochtief in March 2007, initially denying any intention to take over the German group. In 
the following months ACS increased its shareholding to just below 30 per cent, the threshold for a 
mandatory offer under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act 2001, s 30, and announced its plan to 
make a takeover offer. It intended to acquire control (defined as ‘the holding of at least 30 per cent of the 
voting rights in the target company’ (ibid, s 29(2)) through a voluntary bid in order to evade the 
requirement to make a mandatory bid (ibid, s 30(3)). Hochtief qualified the bid as hostile. In December 
2010, a few days after ACS had published its offer, the management board of Hochtief made use of the 
authorised capital that had been created at the annual general meeting earlier in the year and increased the 
company’s capital by 10 per cent under exclusion of pre-emption rights. Qatar Holding subscribed to all 
new shares for contributions in cash. See Hochtief press release of 6 December 2010 at 
<http://www.hochtief.com/hochtief_en/201.jhtml?pid=8665>. The shares were ostensibly issued to 
Qatar Holding to develop a ‘strategic partnership’, but they had the effect of diluting the holding of ACS 
from just below 30 per cent to ca 27 per cent and potentially requiring ACS to submit a second, 
mandatory bid if they failed to acquire control with the first, voluntary offer. The share issue was, 
therefore, evidently designed to make the bid more costly and function as a takeover defence. It is 
instructive to consider the authorisation in the company’s articles creating the authorised capital. The 
authorisation distinguished between a capital increase against cash contributions not exceeding 10 per 
cent of the legal capital and an increase against non-cash contributions exceeding 10 per cent. The 
resolution of the general meeting authorised the management board ‘to exclude shareholders’ 
subscription rights up to an amount when using this authorization [to increase the share capital] once or 
several times that is not more than 10 per cent of the share capital on the date this authorization becomes 
effective and – if this value is lower – the share capital which exists on the date this authorization is 
exercised, in order to issue the new shares against cash contributions at an issuing price which is not 
significantly lower than the stock market price of the shares of the company which are already listed on 
the date the issuing amount is finally determined’. See Hochtief Notice of General Shareholders’ Meeting 
of May 11, 2010, 17. The notice is available from the website of Hochtief AG at 
<http://www.hochtief.com/hochtief_en/730.jhtml> (follow hyperlinks ‘General Shareholders’ Meeting 
2010’ and ‘Invitation to the General Shareholders’ Meeting’). In respect of capital increases not 
conforming to these conditions the resolution required that the capital increase ‘is used to acquire 
companies, parts of companies or equity participations in companies or other assets’. ibid. The 
management board explained that the exclusion of pre-emption rights in such cases ‘allows the company 
to react quickly and flexibly to opportunities that may present themselves […]. The authorization applied 
for will thus, in a given situation, allow optimum financing of the acquisition against the issue of new 
shares while strengthening the company’s equity base. […] In any case, the company’s management will 
only use the opportunity of a capital increase against non-cash contributions using the authorization to 
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restricting the board’s autonomy are, due to their binding nature, probably even 
more effective in preventing abuse of pre-emption right waivers than the self-
regulatory initiatives of the Pre-Emption Group in the United Kingdom. 
 
3.1.4 Asset sales/crown jewels defence 
Asset sales fall within the competence of the management board, with the 
exception of a transfer of the entire undertaking of the company.185 Therefore, the 
sale of the company’s crown jewels constitutes a takeover defence that can, in 
principal, be adopted by management without involvement of the general meeting 
– subject to the constraints on the discretion of management that will be discussed 
below. If the company enters into a contract to transfer its entire undertaking 
without effecting a merger or other form of business combination pursuant to 
applicable statutory procedures, which all provide for shareholder involvement,186 
the Stock Corporation Act requires approval of the contract by a resolution of the 
general meeting with at least a 75 per cent majority.187 The courts do not interpret 
the provision literally. The requirement to procure shareholder approval is 
triggered even where particular assets remain with the company, provided that 
they are of no more than ‘subordinate, ancillary importance’.188 The relevant test is 
not exclusively quantitative, involving a comparison between the value of the 
assets that remain and those that are transferred. Rather, the courts ask whether 
the company continues to be able to pursue its statutory objects, at least to a 
limited extent, with the remaining assets.189 Nevertheless, the threshold is high and 
a sale of crown jewels that does not result in a change in the company’s objects 
can be carried out by management alone.190 
                                                                                                                                       
exclude subscription rights from authorized capital if the value of the new shares is reasonably in 
proportion to the value of the compensation for the company, part of a company, the equity interest or 
other asset to be acquired. […] When weighing up all of these circumstances, the authorization to exclude 
subscription rights to the extent described is required, suitable, reasonable and called for in the company’s 
interest’. ibid, 18-19. The resolution illustrates how the doctrine established in Kali und Salz and refined in 
Siemens/Nold constrains the management board’s discretion to use authorised capital for defensive 
purposes. The authorisation with regard to capital increases not exceeding 10 per cent of Hochtief’s share 
capital was, of course, drafted in a way to enable the management board to take advantage of the safe 
harbour in the Stock Corporation Act, s 186(3) sentence 4. Hochtief used only this part of the authorised 
capital to defend against ACS. Apparently, it was felt that with respect to capital increases beyond the 
scope of s 186(3) sentence 4 defensive measures were not covered by the description of the purpose of a 
capital increase as stipulated in the resolution and that the proportionality requirement developed in the 
case law and reproduced in the resolution left the capital increase vulnerable to legal challenges. This 
limited room for manoeuvre of the board of Hochtief was not sufficient to defend against ACS’s bid. In 
spite of the diluting effect of the 10 per cent share issue, ACS succeeded in acquiring control through its 
voluntary offer and is now free to increase its shareholding in due course without the need to make 
another bid. For a timeline of the events in the Hochtief/ACS case, see ‘ACS nimmt Hürde von 30 
Prozent’ (4 January 2011). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
185 Stock Corporation Act, s 179a. 
186 See in particular Transformation Act, Law of 28 October 1994 (Federal Law Gazette I p 3210). 
187 s 179a(1). 
188 Imperial Court (RG), RGZ 124, 279, 294 (rejecting an application of what is now the Stock 
Corporation Act, s 179a, even though the asset sale led to a substantial restructuring of the company 
because outstanding claims that amounted to several million RM were excluded from the transfer). 
189 Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 83, 122 (Holzmüller). 
190 Assuming that directors’ duties do not require otherwise. See further text to nn 201-233 below. 
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3.2 GENERAL CORPORATE LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF BOARD 
CONTROLLED DEFENCES 
 
3.2.1 The pre-Takeover Act 2001 position 
We consider here general principled restrictions on the use of takeover defences in 
German law. The adoption of the 2001 Takeover Act, and its explicit approval of 
the use of takeover defences in certain circumstances, renders the application of 
these general principles partially moot today. However, for our purposes these 
restrictions remain important for two reasons. First, these general principles 
continue to be of relevance for pre-bid-defences191 and offers that do not fall 
within the scope of the Takeover Act.192 Secondly, the 2001 Act is in large part the 
product of the Takeover Directive process initiated by the Commission. To the 
extent that the 2001 Act overrules pre-existing German law that would have 
constrained the use of takeover defences it raises the interesting question of 
whether the Directive process itself undermined its own objectives by altering a 
pre-Directive neutrality bias in German corporate law – a process that the 
Commission may have thought twice about had they paid attention to Member 
State corporate law. 
 
3.2.2 General duty of neutrality 
The question whether the management board is subject to a general duty not to 
adopt measures that may frustrate a takeover bid was hotly debated before 
adoption of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act of 2001. Both the legal 
foundation of the duty and its extent are controversial. Court decisions that could 
provide guidance are rare,193 reflecting the dormant nature of the market for 
corporate control in Germany for most of the last century. Commentators 
                                                     
191 The (qualified) BNR pursuant to the Takeover Act, s 33, applies from ‘publication of the decision to 
make an offer [...] until publication of the result’. s 33(1). Before publication, the management board is 
subject to the general corporate legal restraints in adopting preventive measures. See Krause and Pötzsch, 
n 90 above, s 33/71, 243-245. However, the literature suggests that these restraints (for example the 
general duty of neutrality – see below in the main text) have to be modified now, after adoption of the 
2001 Takeover Act, in order to avoid inconsistencies with the 2001 Act, s 33. It is argued that pre-bid 
defences should not be subject to more stringent requirements (as was the case under the general 
corporate law BNR before adoption of the 2001 Act) than defences that fall within the scope of the 
Takeover Act, s 33. See H. Krause and T. Pötzsch, ibid, s33/71, 245; A. Schwennicke in S. Geibel and R. 
Süßmann (eds), Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Munich: CH Beck, 2nd ed, 2008), s 33/61; L. Röh 
and H.G. Vogel in Haarmann and Schüppen (eds), n 89 above, Vor ss 33ff/68-69; R. Steinmeyer in R. 
Steinmeyer and M. Häger (eds), Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 2nd ed, 
2007), s 33/7. 
192 Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, s 1. Importantly, the Takeover Act only applies to securities 
of target companies (German stock corporations or partnerships limited by shares or companies 
domiciled in another Member State of the European Economic Area) that are admitted to trading on an 
‘organised’ market (equivalent to the regulated market under MiFID). See ibid, ss 1(1), 2(3), (7). 
193 See, eg, Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 70, 117 (Mannesmann) (holding that the introduction 
of a five per cent voting cap as a defensive measure by resolution of the general meeting was legitimate); 
Regional Court (LG) Düsseldorf, WM 2000, 528 (discussing the permissibility of the target’s board to 
conduct an advertising campaign advocating a rejection of the offer). 
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generally rely either on the provisions of the Stock Corporation Act that define the 
powers and competences of the management board,194 or the equal treatment 
principle,195 to argue that the board is not entitled to influence the ownership 
structure of the company.196 Some endorse a far-reaching duty of neutrality, 
holding that the board is prohibited from adopting any measure that frustrates the 
bid with the exception of: statements by the board that inform the shareholders 
about the advantages or disadvantages of the offer; the search for a competing 
offer; and the use of defences where the offer is likely to cause substantial damage 
to the company, for example by damaging its market position.197 Others identify a 
weaker restraint on defensive action involving a requirement that the defensive 
action is in the interest of the target and its shareholders.198 A minority denies the 
existence of a strict duty of neutrality and accords the management board greater 
freedom in deploying potentially frustrating devices.199 However, this view also 
acknowledges that the management board does not have unfettered discretion to 
react to a takeover offer as it sees fit, but that it must act in the interest of the 
company, the shareholders, and potentially other stakeholders (such as the 
employees), and not in order to entrench itself.200 
Notwithstanding the fact that the existence and parameters of a general duty 
of neutrality remain uncertain, it is uncontroversial that directors’ duties require 
the board in some situations to refrain from adopting measures that tamper with 
the right of shareholders to determine the structure of the company and to decide 
on fundamental changes. While the courts have not addressed the question of an 
all-encompassing duty of neutrality, they have dealt with more specific issues of 
interference with membership rights by the management board. This body of case 
law is informed by duties that safeguard the supremacy of the general meeting in 
particular transactions. It can, accordingly, be understood as shaping the duty of 
neutrality for the instances that it deals with. It lends weight to the thesis that the 
requirement of board neutrality is an undercurrent of large parts of general 
German corporate law. The next sections will give an overview of the most 
relevant cases and discuss their implications for takeover defences. 
 
                                                     
194 Most importantly the Stock Corporation Act, s 76(1), which provides that the management board shall 
manage the company under its own responsibility. This view is informed by the Holzmüller case law of the 
Federal Court of Justice, which will be discussed in the next section. 
195 See s 3.2.2 below. 
196 See, eg, Hefermehl and Spindler, n 99 above, s 76/28-29; K.J. Hopt, ‘Aktionärskreis und 
Vorstandsneutralität’ (1993) 22 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 534, 545-566; G. 
Krieger, ‘Aktionärsklage zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandelns’ (1999) 163 Zeitschrift für 
das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) 343, 357-358; H.J. Mertens and A. Cahn in W. Zöllner 
and U. Noack (eds), Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 3rd ed, 2010), vol 2/1, s 
76/25-27; L. Michalski, ‘Abwehrmechanismen gegen Unfreundliche Übernahmeangebote (‘unfriendly 
takeovers’) nach Deutschem Aktienrecht’ (1997) 42 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 152, 159. 
197 See, eg, Hefermehl and Spindler, n 99 above, s 76/28-29. 
198 See, eg, Mertens and Cahn, n 196 above, s 76/26. 
199 Hüffer, n 121 above, s 76/15d; M. Kort in Hopt and Wiedemann (eds), n 150 above, vol 3, s 76/102-
103. 
200 Kort, ibid. 
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3.2.3 Holzmüller and its progeny 
The Stock Corporation Act restricts the broad powers of management in cases 
that affect the rights of shareholders in a fundamental way or that are important to 
ensure the effective control of management, most notably: fundamental changes; 
increase and reduction of capital; appointment of the company’s auditors; and the 
declaration of dividends.201 In these cases, corporate action requires a resolution 
by the general meeting. Outside of these specific approval rights, the general 
meeting does not, however, have the right to instruct management to take or 
refrain from taking a specific action. According to the Act, it can decide on 
matters concerning the management of the company only if requested to do so by 
the management board.202 
The statutory allocation of competences was modified by a famous decision 
of the Federal Court of Justice from 1982, which has given rise to the Court’s so-
called Holzmüller doctrine.203 According to the doctrine, the management board is 
under a duty to lay a matter before the general meeting if the board’s actions have 
the consequence of interfering ‘so substantially with the rights of the members and 
their financial interests that the board cannot reasonably assume that it may take a 
decision in its own right and without participation of the general meeting’.204 
Directors that do not procure a resolution of the general meeting in spite of being 
required to do so pursuant to the Holzmüller doctrine violate their duties under 
section 93(1) Stock Corporation Act.205 Claims for damages can be pursued by the 
company or the shareholders in the form of a derivative action.206 Furthermore, 
shareholders can bring a claim for violation of their membership rights against the 
company (not the directors individually), which is directed at a declaration that the 
action of the board is null and void or, if possible, restoration of the position prior 
to the breach of duty.207 
The courts have not had much opportunity to consider the application of the 
Holzmüller doctrine to takeover defences. The Regional Court of Düsseldorf that 
dealt with the Mannesmann takeover,208 held that defensive measures taken by the 
                                                     
201 Stock Corporation Act, s 119(1). 
202 ibid, s 119(2). The board may decide to procure a shareholder decision in order to limit its exposure to 
liability pursuant to the Stock Corporation Act, s 93(4) sentence 1. 
203 Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 83, 122. 
204 In Holzmüller, the Court of Justice applied the Stock Corporation Act, s 119(2), and argued that the 
management board’s discretion to lay a matter before the general meeting was transformed into a duty 
under appropriate circumstances. In subsequent decisions the Court altered its interpretation of the 
dogmatic foundations of the doctrine. It moved away from an outright application of s 119(2) and now 
combines the consequences that that provision entails (namely, that the transfer of decision-making 
competences to the general meeting does not exert any legal effects towards third parties) with the 
requirement that the case under consideration must be analogous to one of the express cases of 
shareholder decision-making that are contained in the Stock Corporation Act. See Federal Court of 
Justice (BGH), BGHZ 159, 30, 42-43 (Gelatine I). 
205 Federal Court of Justice, n 203 above, 131. 
206 Stock Corporation Act, s 148. 
207 Federal Court of Justice, n 203 above, 125-127, 133-136. 
208 See n 193 above. 
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management board may be, in principle, subject to the requirements established in 
Holzmüller. However, the fact that the company is the target of a takeover does not 
entail an all-encompassing transfer of competences to the general meeting for any 
actions which can prevent the success of the offer.209 Rather, the Court argued 
that it has to be decided on a case-by-case basis whether the measure interferes 
with shareholder rights in a fundamental way and is, therefore, comparable to the 
situation decided in Holzmüller.210 Interference with shareholder rights is not of the 
required level of intensity if the management board actively campaigns against 
accepting the offer, for example, by means of newspaper advertisements, internet 
announcements, or road shows. It may fall within the scope of Holzmüller if the 
board decides to sell important assets or enter into contracts outside the normal 
course of business.211 
After Holzmüller there was much speculation in the lower courts and the 
literature about the threshold necessary to trigger a shift in competences.212 Some 
clarification was provided by the Federal Court of Justice in two recent decisions 
(Gelatine I and II).213 The Court held that the acts of the management board 
required shareholder approval if they touched upon the ‘core competence’ of the 
general meeting to determine the constitution of the company and were in their 
consequences very similar to those that necessitated an alteration of the articles.214 
The two judgments show that the Court is restrictive in its interpretation of the 
Holzmüller doctrine and considers the allocation of power in the Stock Corporation 
Act as authoritative save in exceptional cases. After Gelatine, it is questionable 
whether asset sales without any further interference with shareholder rights 
continue to be subject to the requirement of shareholder approval.215 In addition, 
the quantitative threshold for an application of the doctrine is higher than was 
previously assumed by the courts.216 It is now generally accepted that the assets in 
                                                     
209 Regional Court Düsseldorf, n 193 above, 529-530. 
210 ibid, 530. 
211 ibid, 530-531. 
212 For an overview, see T. Raiser and R. Veil, Recht der Kapitalgesellschaften (Munich: Franz Vahlen, 5th ed, 
2010), s 16/13.  
213 Federal Court of Justice, n 204 above, and ZIP 2004, 1001 (Gelatine II). 
214 n 204 above, 44. 
215 See, on the one hand, BGH AG 2007, 203; Higher Regional Court (OLG) Hamm, AG 2008, 421-422 
(deciding in the negative); on the other hand, OLG Schleswig, AG 2006, 120, 123 (deciding in the 
positive). The restrictive interpretation is based on the fact that both in Holzmüller and Gelatine assets were 
not simply sold to a third party, but removed from the direct reach of the shareholders through 
reorganisations or the spinning-off of the assets, ie their transfer to a subsidiary. The Court in Gelatine 
acknowledged that it was this ‘intermediating effect’ that gave rise to the interference with shareholder 
rights. n 204 above, 41. For a discussion of this point see, eg, M. Habersack, ‘Mitwirkungsrechte der 
Aktionäre nach Macrotron und Gelatine’ (2005) 50 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 137, 144-148; T. Liebscher, 
‘Ungeschriebene Hauptversammlungszuständigkeiten im Lichte von Holzmüller, Macrotron und 
Gelatine’ (2005) 34 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 1, 24; Raiser and Veil, n 212 
above, s 16/13. 
216 See, eg, Regional Court (LG) Frankfurt, ZIP 1997, 1698, and Higher Regional Court (OLG) 
Frankfurt, ZIP 1999, 842 (Altana/Milupa) (requiring a decision of the general meeting for a sale of a 
subsidiary that generated 30 per cent of the group’s revenue). 
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question must amount to 75 to 80 per cent of total assets or revenue in order to 
trigger the Holzmüller obligations.217 
In light of the clarifications, the decision of the Regional Court Düsseldorf 
discussed above, which was delivered before Gelatine, has to be applied carefully. 
However, it does not follow that the Holzmüller doctrine has lost its relevance for 
defensive measures unless the 75-80 per cent threshold has been reached.218 There 
are good reasons why under both Holzmüller and Gelatine the management board 
does not have unfettered discretion to use asset sales as a takeover defence. First, 
the cases decided by the Federal Court of Justice did not involve takeover bids. 
Thus, the fact that asset sales that are effected in the normal course of business 
may no longer be susceptible to violating the Holzmüller principles,219 does not 
mean that the same holds if they are used to frustrate a hostile bid.220 Second, 
Holzmüller and Gelatine are not only about quantitative thresholds. Rather, the test 
developed by the Court is a bifurcated one, comprising both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria. This can be seen most clearly in Gelatine, where the Court 
distinguishes between the character of the transaction as a ‘structural measure’ 
(Strukturmaßnahme) or a transaction comparable to such a measure, and the level of 
intensity of interference with the protected position of the shareholders 
(Wesentlichkeitsschwelle).221 Both parts of the test are preconditions for the unwritten 
competence of the general meeting.222 In relation to the first part, relevant factors 
are: the close resemblance of the case in issue to any of the express cases of 
shareholder decision-making in the Stock Corporation Act or similar acts223 (and 
not only the rules on a transfer of the entire undertaking of the company);224 an 
alteration of the structure of the company;225 an impairment of the shareholders’ 
                                                     
217 H. Fleischer, ‘Ungeschriebene Hauptversammlungszuständigkeiten im Aktienrecht: Von “Holzmüller” 
zu “Gelatine”’ (2004) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2335, 2337; Liebscher, n 215 above, 15. 
218 But see Davies, et al, n 10 above, 12 (arguing that the Holzmüller doctrine requires that the disposals 
reach 80 per cent of total assets); Raiser and Veil, n 212 above, s 44/42 (rejecting an application of the 
Holzmüller doctrine to asset sales as a defensive measure altogether because of the lack of ‘intermediation’ 
of shareholder rights); J. Reichert, ‘Mitwirkungsrechte und Rechtsschutz der Aktionäre nach Macrotron 
und Gelatine’ (2005) 50 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 150, 157 (pointing out that the initiation of or 
participation in a takeover by the target’s board does not trigger Holzmüller because the successful 
takeover only changes the composition of the shareholder body, and this change depends on the decision 
of each shareholder to accept or reject the offer). 
219 See n 215 above. 
220 The Federal Court of Justice in Gelatine acknowledged that reorganisations were only one of several 
possible cases of unwritten shareholder competence. It stressed the importance of an ‘intermediating 
effect’ in the context of that particular case, ie reorganisations. See n 204 above, 41. 
221 n 204 above, 47-48. 
222 In Gelatine, the plaintiffs won on the first count but lost on the second. 
223 The Transformation Act, n 186 above, which regulates mergers, divisions, change of legal form, and 
other, similar transactions, should deserve the same consideration as the Stock Corporation Act in this 
context. See Federal Court of Justice, n 204 above, 45-46. 
224 Federal Court of Justice, n 203 above, 131; n 204 above, 37-38, 41, 44-45. The two decisions of the 
Federal Court of Justice that have so far accepted an unwritten competence of the general meeting dealt 
with divestments and reorganisations (transfer of a direct holding to a second-tier subsidiary). 
225 Federal Court of Justice, n 204 above, 36. 
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financial interests;226 or an interference with other membership rights.227 The 
second (quantitative) part is satisfied if the alteration of the structure of the 
company or interference with shareholder rights is ‘fundamental’228 or ‘severe’.229 
The two parts of the test are interrelated. What is ‘fundamental’ or ‘severe’ is 
transaction-specific and cannot be answered in generic terms, for example by 
specifying a generally applicable, numerical threshold.230 
As regards the first part of the test, takeovers resemble other fundamental 
changes in that a successful takeover leads to new ownership of the company, 
which, in turn, often entails a replacement of management, recalibration of the 
business strategy, and reorganisation of the undertaking. It constitutes a ‘structural 
measure’ that has manifest ramifications for the rights and position of the existing 
shareholders, both those that decide to stay as minority shareholders in the 
company and those that would like to sell out. As far as the second part of the test 
is concerned, it is suggested that it is more meaningful to focus on the 
effectiveness of the defensive measure, rather than the value of the assets that 
management intends to transfer. In other words, the question should be whether 
the defensive tactic will most likely be successful and as a result shareholders will 
be denied the opportunity to accept the offer and decide about the future of the 
undertaking. The asset sale will interfere in a ‘fundamental’ or ’severe’ way with 
shareholder rights if it is likely to frustrate the takeover, notwithstanding the value 
of the assets. This interpretation is in line with the spirit and purpose of the 
Holzmüller line of cases, which seek to protect shareholders against 
disenfranchisement.231 A more significant interference than the denial of the right 
to decide on a fundamental change is hardly imaginable. That the law takes the 
protection of shareholders against disenfranchisement in connection with 
fundamental changes seriously is also shown by the fact that the validity of other 
fundamental changes (mergers, divisions, change of legal form, voluntary winding-
up, profit transfer, or control agreements) depends on shareholder approval by a 
75 per cent majority and, furthermore, that these requirements are mandatory, and 
the articles cannot provide otherwise, for example for a lower majority.232 
                                                     
226 ibid, 40. 
227 ibid, 41. 
228 Ibid, 36. 
229 ibid, 41. 
230 Consequently, the figure of 75-80 per cent is used by courts and commentators only in relation to 
asset sales in the context of reorganisations. 
231 It is also in accordance with the majority view before adoption of the Securities Acquisitions and 
Takeover Act. See n 196 above. 
232 Mergers: Transformation Act, s 65(1); divisions: ibid, s 125; change of legal form: ibid, s 240(1); 
voluntary winding-up: Stock Corporation Act, s 262(1) no 2; profit transfer and control agreements: ibid, 
s 293. Of course, the codification of the position of shareholders in takeovers in the Securities 
Acquisitions and Takeover Act of 2001 has made clear that the legislature did not wish to convey the 
same decision-making power on shareholders in the context of takeovers as it did with respect to mergers 
and other fundamental changes. This may be as it is, but we are proceeding here on the basis of the 
assumption that an explicit regulation of board and shareholder competences in takeovers does not exist. 
The law as it stood in 2001 before the Securities Acquisitions and Takeover Act was adopted lends 
weight to the suggestion that shareholders have the final say on the success or failure of takeovers but for 
an explicit provision to the contrary. 
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How the courts would assess this situation is, of course, speculation, given 
that the Holzmüller doctrine has only been fleshed out in a rudimentary way with 
regard to takeovers. But these considerations may at least have shown that the 
issue is not as clear-cut as sometimes presented in the literature and that the level 
of shareholder protection in takeovers in Germany prior to 2001, when Germany 
had neither an express board neutrality rule nor its 2001 Takeover Act, antithesis 
was far from nonexistent.233 
 
3.2.4 Continuing uncertainty about the status of Holzmüller 
It is commonly acknowledged that the general duty of neutrality is no longer 
applicable after the adoption of the Takeover Act 2001.234 However, the 
implications of the Act for the status of Holzmüller are more problematic. In order 
to appreciate the relationship between the Takeover Act and Holzmüller, it is 
necessary to assess how the two measures affect and delineate the position and 
competences of the board and the shareholders. Section 33 of the Takeover Act, 
which establishes the modified board neutrality rule, is generally interpreted as 
being duty-related. The directors violate their duties if they adopt defensive 
measures that are not in conformity with the provision.235 This interpretation is 
convincing. Initially, the draft Takeover Act stipulated that acts of the 
management board and the supervisory board that might result in the takeover 
offer being frustrated had to be authorised by the shareholders in general 
meeting.236 Thus, similar to the measures that fall within the competences of the 
general meeting pursuant to the Stock Corporation Act, the draft Takeover Act 
provided for a shift in competences from the management board to the general 
meeting. This was altered in Parliament. The Act as adopted removed the 
supervisory board from the scope of the board neutrality rule and imposed the 
obligation on the management board ‘not [to] take any actions which could prevent 
the success of the offer’,237 rather than restricting the board’s powers to do so 
without shareholder authorisation. Parliament explained that the change was 
intended to enable the board to deploy defensive measures within their 
competences if the supervisory board consented to the measure.238 
                                                     
233 For this reason (and in light of the points made in the preceding sections, see particularly text to nn 
166-184 above), it does not seem to be justified to accord Germany a BNR score of zero before 
implementation of the Takeover Directive, as Davies, et al, n 10 above, 36, have done. It is appreciated 
that this score reflects the fact that an express BNR did not exist before transposition of the Directive (and 
still does not exist in Germany, as is indicated by the same score post-implementation. ibid, 31), but it is 
precisely our point that the non-existence of the rule cannot be relied on alone to determine the extent of 
the board’s defensive power.   
234 See for example Krause and Pötzsch, n 90 above, s 33/50; Röh and Vogel, n 191 above, s 33/23; H. 
Hirte in H. Hirte and C. von Bülow (eds), Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 2003), 
s 33/27-28; R. Steinmeyer in Steinmeyer and Häger (eds), n 191 above, s 33/6. 
235 See, eg, Krause and Pötzsch, n 90 above, s 33/17, 87; A. Schwennicke in Geibel and Süßmann (eds), n 
191 above, s 33/18. 
236 Bundestags-Drucksache 14/7477, 25. 
237 Takeover Act, s 33(1). 
238 Bundestags-Drucksache 14/7477, 53. 
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In this respect, there is some overlap with Holzmüller, which also refers to 
duties, namely the duty of the management board to procure a decision of the 
general meeting under certain conditions.239 In contrast to the express provisions 
of the Stock Corporation Act that require shareholder approval,240 this duty-based 
approach does not interfere with the power of the management board to effect 
transactions on behalf of the company that are legally binding in relation to third 
parties.241 However, Holzmüller has a second dimension that was emphasised by 
the subsequent Gelatine judgments.242 Non-compliance with the Holzmüller duties 
interferes with the membership rights of the shareholders, with the consequence that 
they have standing to sue, whereas a violation of the neutrality rule does not give 
rise to claims of the shareholders (but only to claims of the company for breach of 
directors’ duties).243 That is, one reading of Holzmüller is that it is based on a theory 
of authority or competences, namely that the board does not have the authority to 
take the action where it interferes with the fundamental rights covered by 
Holzmüller. If this is the correct reading of Holzmüller, then the Takeover Act would 
not cover any defensive action that falls within Holzmüller. That is, the Takeover 
Act would not be deemed to authorise defensive board action that affects 
fundamental shareholder rights, because the Act only authorises the board to use 
the powers that it has defensively.  Indeed, consistent with this view the literature 
assumes that the ‘classical’ Holzmüller doctrine, requiring shareholder approval for 
reorganisations involving transfers of assets exceeding 75-80 per cent of total 
assets, is of continued validity and constrains the discretion of the management 
board to adopt defensive measures, even where the supervisory board gives their 
consent.244 If this is correct, then Holzmüller could continue to operate as a general 
restriction on the use of takeover defences as outlined above.   
Such a reading would, of course, create a conflict between the legislative 
approval of defensive action and a judicial rule that provides that boards do not 
have authority to take steps that have defensive effects. It is clearly possible, if not 
probable, that the courts would side with the legislative provision or take a narrow 
reading of Holzmüller in those circumstances. A third possibility is that an authority 
restriction based on Holzmüller would remain, but would only be triggered where 
the defensive action involved a particularly potent interference with shareholder 
rights, such as a poison pill, but not where the defence was less potent, for 
example, in relation to a low percentage share issue or buy-back. Given the 
difficulty of constructing potent defences in Germany, one suspects that we may 
have to wait a long time to obtain judicial resolution of these difficult issues.   
 
                                                     
239 See n 204 above. 
240 For example the Stock Corporation Act, s 179a. 
241 Takeover Act, s 82(1). 
242 See nn 204, 213 above. 
243 Stock Corporation Act, s 93(2). For an overview of these problems, see Krause and Pötzsch, n 90 
above, s 33/304-321. 
244 Krause and Pötzsch, ibid, s 33/50 (n 8); Röh and Vogel, n 191 above, s 33/85, 90. The same 
reasoning applies with respect to the Kali und Salz requirements. 
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3.2.5 The post-Takeover Act 2001 position 
General principles of corporate law that do not explicitly address board neutrality 
and that are not in conflict with the will of the legislator of the 2001 Act continue 
to apply and constrain the discretion of the directors as they take decisions within 
the parameters of the Takeover Act.245 Important, particularly with regard to 
future changes in corporate law that could render a poison pill more readily 
available than it is today, is the general principle of equal shareholder protection. 
As we have seen above, the standard poison pill arrangement is unavailable 
pursuant to German Corporate law. Small changes in German corporate law 
could, however, but still with ex-ante shareholder approval, make them available. 
German law would simply need to be amended to allow the issue of naked 
warrants.  
Poison pills are effective because they exclude the right of the bidder who 
crosses the trigger threshold to purchase voting equity in accordance with the 
terms of the warrant. While we have argued that there are good reasons to assume 
that a pill would not be considered discriminatory in the United Kingdom, since it 
gives all holders of shares the same (conditional) right to buy additional shares, the 
issue may well be assessed differently in Germany. The equal treatment principle 
laid down in the Stock Corporation Act is phrased more broadly than its UK 
counterpart, requiring that ‘shareholders shall be treated equally under equal 
conditions’.246 Thus, as opposed to the UK Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, the 
requirement does not refer to ‘the rights attaching to [shares]’, but more generally 
to ‘shareholders’. Unequal treatment may not only result from an explicit 
differentiation between groups of shareholders and the rights attaching to their 
shares, but also from provisions that impose a de facto disadvantage on some 
shareholders but not on others that derives, for example, from the size of their 
shareholding.247  
The implications of the equal treatment principle for shareholder rights plans 
or dilutive warrants issued by convertible bonds have not been evaluated by the 
courts, but a decision of the Federal Court of Justice from 1977 (Mannesmann) 
bears a certain resemblance to the problem here at issue and might prove 
                                                     
245 See the explanatory memorandum of the draft Takeover Act, Bundestags-Drucksache 14/7034, 58; 
and from the literature, eg, Krause and Pötzsch, ibid, s 33/50-52; Röh and Vogel, ibid, s 33/24; Hirte, n 
234 above, s 33/28, 72-73. 
246 Stock Corporation Act, s 53a, implementing the Second Company Law Directive, Directive 
77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, 1977 OJ L 26/1, art 42. While the equal treatment principle was not 
expressly included in the Stock Corporation Act before implementation of the Directive in 1978, it has 
for a long time been part of the courts’ jurisprudence. For decisions discussing the principle before 
adoption of s 53a see, for example, Imperial Court (RG), RGZ 113, 152, 156; 118, 67, 70; 120, 177, 180; 
Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 20, 363, 369; 120, 141, 150; and Federal Constitutional Court 
(BVerfG), BVerfGE 14, 263, 285. 
247 This is commonly acknowledged in the literature. See, eg, A. Cahn and M.A. Senger in Spindler and 
Stilz (eds), n 133 above, vol 1, s 53a/24-26, for references. The authors speak of ‘formal’ and ‘material’ 
differentiation, the latter referring to what we call ‘de facto disadvantage’. 
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instructive.248 The case dealt with the introduction of a voting cap in order to 
insulate the company from control changes at a time when the shareholding of at 
least one investor already exceeded the quota thus established. The Court held that 
under these circumstances the voting cap constituted differential treatment that 
interfered potentially significantly with the voting rights of shareholders.249 In 
other words, even though the measure did not differentiate between shareholders 
formally, it fell within the ambit of the equal treatment principle because its effects 
on voting rights were different depending on the size of the shareholding. 
However, simply because corporate action implicates the equal protection 
provision does not mean that it violates the statute. The courts have stressed that 
the equal treatment principle only prohibits the general meeting and the 
management board from distinguishing between shareholders in an arbitrary 
manner, ie without objective justification.250 In Mannesmann the differential 
treatment was justified because it was held to be necessary ‘to shield the company 
from external forces obtaining control, strengthen the independence of the 
management board, and protect small shareholders against the dominating 
influence of blockholders’.251 While this holding is relatively permissive, it is 
important to note that the voting cap was introduced by resolution of the general 
meeting, not by board action. Based on the limited authority available, German 
courts would impose a more demanding standard on the use of board-controlled 
takeover defences if they resulted in the disenfranchisement or dilution of 
particular of shareholders. This can be seen clearly in the case of the exclusion of 
pre-emption rights and allotment of shares to selected shareholders, which needs 
to be justified in accordance with the principles established by the Kali und Salz 
line of cases.252 
Accordingly, in our view, there is reason to think that a standard poison pill 
(assuming it could be put in place) would violate the German equal protection of 
shareholders provision unless the shareholders explicitly authorised their issue as a 
defensive measure, or the bidders’ actions represented a serious threat to the 
company as a going concern. 
  
3.3 PRACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The discussion so far has shown that even in the absence of an express duty of 
neutrality the availability of most takeover defences is restricted. Therefore, the 
                                                     
248 Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 70, 117. 
249 ibid, 121. 
250 See, eg, Imperial Court (RG), RGZ 68, 210, 212 and Federal Court of Justice (BGH), BGHZ 33, 175.  
251 BGHZ 70, 117, 122-123. 
252 See the text to nn 166-184 above. A controversial case, albeit one decided before Kali und Salz, is 
BGHZ 33, 175 (Minimax II), where the Federal Court of Justice allowed the board to make a non-pre-
emptive issue to particular shareholders that were affiliated with the board in order to defend against a 
hostile bid. The Court held that, in allotting shares, the board had a duty not to favour some shareholders 
over others. However, the unequal treatment was justified in the case at hand in light of the egregious 
behaviour of the bidder, which, for example, included aggravating the financial difficulties of the target in 
order to achieve its goal of acquiring and breaking up the company. See ibid, 186-188. 
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question whether, and to what extent, the defences would be practically effective is 
a largely theoretical exercise. All of the defence types addressed in this paper are 
subject to significant restrictions on availability and use. There is little that is 
formally available. What is formally available is of limited potency. However, for 
purposes of completeness we consider briefly the issue of practical effectiveness 
under German corporate law. 
In several respects, German law is less shareholder-friendly than that of the 
United Kingdom when it comes to the removal of directors. Since the members of 
the management board are appointed by the supervisory board,253 the first step 
toward replacing the management of the target company is the replacement of the 
members of the supervisory board.254 Supervisory board members serve a 
maximum term of five years.255 The articles may provide for a staggered board, 
although this is not common in German companies.256 A bidder who obtains a 
qualified majority can, of course, amend the articles and repeal the staggered board 
provision. The members of the supervisory board can be removed before 
expiration of their term of office without cause by three-fourths majority.257 
However, the new supervisory board, in turn, can only remove the members of 
the management board for ‘an important reason’ before their term of office 
expires.258 A change of control is not considered an ‘important reason’.259 
Therefore, the bidder in general needs to procure a vote of no confidence by the 
general meeting, which will then enable the supervisory board to remove the 
members of the management board.260 Note in this regard that five per cent of the 
shareholder body has a mandatory right to call a shareholder meeting.261 
Finally, apart from the cases specified in the Stock Corporation Act (and 
extended by Holzmüller) that require shareholder approval, the general meeting 
does not have the right to engage in decision-making unless requested to do so by 
the management board.262 Therefore, as mentioned, the shareholders are not 
entitled to give instructions to the management board and cannot instruct 
management to remove defences that have been put in place earlier. 
Accordingly, board members that deploy the available defences benefit from 
a greater degree of removal protection than the board of a UK company. 
However, as compared to the protection which Delaware removal rights provide 
Delaware directors, directors of widely-held German companies are more 
exposed. In contrast to a Delaware corporation with a staggered board, they could 
                                                     
253 Stock Corporation Act, s 84. 
254 In companies that are subject to co-determination the bidder can only replace the shareholder-
appointed members of the supervisory board. See ibid, ss 95-96. 
255 ibid, s 102. 
256 Hirte, n 234 above, s 33/177. 
257 Stock Corporation Act, s 103(1). 
258 ibid, s 84(3). 
259 Raiser and Veil, n 212 above, s 14/39. 
260 Stock Corporation Act, s 84(3). 
261 ibid, s 122(1). 
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all be removed at any time by a shareholder meeting committed to their removal – 
enabling the redemption of any pill that is put in place – and they cannot, as many 
Delaware directors can, take comfort in a guaranteed cool-off period, until the 
next annual shareholder meeting, following the successful defence of a bid. 
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
If the Takeover Directive provided for a mandatory board neutrality rule it would 
have the important effect of removing the Takeover Act 2001. However, its actual 
impact on the contestability of widely-held German companies would be limited. 
US-type poison pills are not available because they require a flexibility that the 
German corporate law cannot offer. A qualified version of the pill could, albeit 
with some practical difficulty, be put in place through an ex ante nominal 
convertible bond issued with shareholder approval. If the practical difficulties can 
be overcome, any such constructed defence requires explicit ex-ante shareholder 
approval and is subject to ex-post constraint of the equal protection standard. As 
far as the equity restructuring defence is concerned, the Stock Corporation Act 
provides for ex-ante shareholder approval. Shareholders could, if concerned about 
ex-post manipulation of the authorisation, place conditions on the authorisation. If 
the management board has been authorised to allot shares and exclude pre-
emption rights, the case law developed by the Federal Court of Justice has, in 
relation to greater than 10 per cent non-pre-emptive issues, supplemented the 
statutory provisions with duties that require the proportionality of the decision of 
the management board and a description of the envisaged use of the authorisation 
in the resolution creating the authorised capital. Furthermore, as the recent 
Hochtief-ACS takeover demonstrates, a 10 per cent share issue defence has a 
limited defensive impact.  
Of the three takeover defences analysed in this article, only the crown jewels 
defence, the least potent defensive tactic, can potentially be deployed by 
management without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder involvement. However, the 
courts have refined the statutory allocation of competences and require 
shareholder approval where the transaction interferes fundamentally with 
membership rights, which is understood to mean where the value of the assets 
exceeds the high threshold of 75-80 per cent, and the sale has an ‘intermediating 
effect’.263  Directors using these defences in the face of a shareholder base that 
wishes to accept the offer may feel safer in their jobs than would their UK 
counterparts (in the absence of the UK non-frustration principle) but will be far 
less secure than their Delaware counterparts. They are likely to use them for 
entrenchment purposes rather warily.  
In relation to even these limited formally available defences, in the pre-2001 
German corporate legal context, such defences would, we have argued, have been 
subject to significant principled-based constraints. These constraints were partly 
                                                     
263 See n 215 above. 
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disposed of by the 2001 Act. While German corporate law maintains even today a 
strong anti-takeover defence bias, as it limits the construction of these defences, it 
seems likely that had the Commission never started its Takeover Directive 
journey, German corporate law’s anti-defence bias would have been even stronger.     
 
 
 
4. DOES ITALY’S OPT-OUT FROM THE BOARD NEUTRALITY 
RULE MATTER? 
  
The newly enacted regime implementing the Takeover Directive, which came into 
force in July 2010, does not impose a mandatory board neutrality rule and makes 
the reciprocity exception available.264 This approach closely mirrors the principles 
underlying the 2008 reform265 of the original transposition of the Takeover 
Directive.266  
The initial implementing rules, which came into effect in December 2007, 
were based on a strong non-frustration principle,267 with a reciprocity option,268 
and essentially confirmed the pre-existing takeover regime.269 Unless authorised by 
a post bid270 resolution adopted by shareholders representing at least 30 per cent 
of the company’s outstanding share capital, directors of an Italian listed company 
                                                     
264 Consolidated Financial Services Act No 58 of 1998 (hereinafter, the ‘CFSA’), art 104. 
265 Law Decree No. 185, art 13, 29 November 2008 (published in the S.O. no. 263/L to the G.U. no. 280 
of 29.11.2009) converted into the Law No. 2 of 28.1.2009 (published in the S.O. no. 14/L to the G.U. 
no. 28.1.2009), which amended CFSA (2007 version), arts 104, 104bis, 104ter. 
266 See Law Decree No. 229, 19 November 2007 (published in the G.U. no. 289 of 13.12.2007), which 
amended CFSA (pre-2007 version), art 104 and introduced CFSA, arts 104bis, 104ter. 
267 CFSA (2007 version), art 104. 
268 CFSA (2007 version), art 104ter. It is uncertain whether this option is permitted by the Takeover 
Directive, arts 12(2), 12(4), when the ‘opt-in’ choice is made by the Member State. See J. Rickford, ‘The 
Emerging European Takeover Law from a British Perspective’ (2004) 15 EBLR 1396. Similar arguments 
in the Italian literature during the 2007 regime can be found in M. Lamandini, ‘Legiferare per “Illusione 
Ottica”? OPA e Reciprocita’ “Italiana”’ (2008) 1 Giurisprudenza Commerciale 240. 
269 CFSA (2007 version), art 104 (1). See C. Mosca, ‘Commento sub Article 104’ in P. Marchetti and L. 
Bianchi (eds), La Disciplina delle Societa’ Quotate nel Testo Unico della Finanza d.lgs. 24 febbraio 1998 n. 58 
(Milan: Giuffre’, 1999); A. Portolano, ‘Un’Analisi Economica della “Passivity Rule” nel Testo Unico della 
Finanza’ (2000) 1 Mercato Concorrenza e Regole  39; M. Gatti, ‘La Societa’ Target in Pendenza di Offerta 
Pubblica d’Acquisto’ (2000) Giurisprudenza Commerciale 632; E. Desana, Opa e Tecniche di Difesa (Milan: 
Giuffre’, 2003), 127; and F.M. Mucciarelli, Societa’ per Azioni e Offerta Pubblica di Acquisto (Milan: Giuffre’, 
2004), 153. A comprehensive account of the Italian debate on the scope of the Takeover Directive can be 
found in A. Angelillis and C. Mosca, ‘Considerazioni sul Recepimento della Tredicesima Direttiva in 
Materia di Offerte Pubbliche di Acquisto e sulla Posizione Espressa nel Documento della Commissione 
Europea’ (2007) Rivista delle Societa’ 1106. The 1998 regime provided by the CFSA relaxed the pre-existing 
strict passivity principle set out in Law No. 149 of 1992, art 16. See F. Vella, ‘La Passivity Rule nella 
Legge Italiana sulle Opa e gli Effetti sul Mercato del Controllo Societario’ (1993) Banca, Impresa e Società 
217; C. Salomao Filho and M. Stella Richter, ‘Note in Tema di Offerte Pubbliche di Acquisto, Ruolo degli 
Amministratori ed Interesse Sociale’ (1993) Rivista di Diritto Commerciale 113; and A. Tron, ‘La Legge n. 
149/1992 e le Strategie “Antiscalata”: un’Analisi Comparata della Regolamentazione Attuale’ in C. Rabitti 
Bedogni (ed), Il Diritto del Mercato Mobiliare (Milan: Giuffre’, 1997), 248. 
270 That is, following the time of the communication of the bid to CONSOB – CFSA (2007 version), art 
104. 
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had to refrain from taking corporate actions which might result in the frustration 
of the bid.  
It was the credit crisis that brought about a ‘change of heart’ in relation to the 
board neutrality rule in 2008.271 Concerns about the vulnerability of Italian 
companies to takeovers following the fall in stock prices resulted in Italian 
regulators electing to make the board neutrality rule optional and allowing 
companies who opted-in to subject the opt-in to a reciprocity requirement.272  
The protectionist trend, albeit in a watered down version,273 continues under 
the current regime where both the non-frustration and the breakthrough rules 
remain optional.274 What has changed is the direction of choice in implementing 
the opt-out mechanism offered by the Takeover Directive.275 Italian companies 
are now subject to the board neutrality rule, unless they opt-out of the provision 
by amending their articles of association.276 The reversal in the board neutrality 
opt-in arrangements adopted in 2008 addressed a specific corporate governance 
issue.277 In the case of a company with a concentrated share ownership structure, 
which is typical in Italy, controlling shareholders with significantly less than 50 per 
cent of the voting rights could block any opt-in resolution. Moreover, in the 
absence of any board initiative, the requirement for a supermajority vote 
exacerbated coordination problems among shareholders, rendering the (opt-in) 
option de facto unavailable.278 By making the board neutrality rule the default rule 
the 2010 reforms alleviate this problem. A resolution passed with the support of 
two-thirds of the votes cast at the meeting,279 is now required to opt-out of the 
board neutrality rule.280  
Where a company has not opted-out of the neutrality rule, the 2010 
implementing legislation provides exceptions to the strict prohibition which are 
consistent with those permitted by the Takeover Directive, namely seeking 
alternative bids,281 and the implementation of any decision taken before the start 
of bid which falls within the normal business practices of the company.282 In 
short, unless a company has opted-out of the neutrality rule, in Italy the board of 
the target company is not allowed to take any action which may result in the 
                                                     
271 See Circolare Assonime 18 April 2009, ‘Le Modifiche alla Disciplina sull’Opa: Regola di Passivita’, 
Regola di Neutralizzazione e Reciprocita’ (decreto anticrisi n.17 del 29 novembre 2008)’ at 
<http://www.emagazine.assonime.it/upload/circolare18_2009.pdf, visited on 6 April 2011>. 
272 CFSA (2008 version), arts 104 (1), 104bis, 104ter. 
273 See Davies, et al, n 10 above . 
274 CFSA, arts 104, 104bis. See A. Morello, ‘Scalate Ostili e Misure Difensive: dalla Direttiva OPA al 
Decreto 146/09’ (2010) Le Societa’ 158, and F. Mucciarelli, ‘La Disciplina dell’Offerta Pubblica 
d’Acquisto’ (2010) Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 92. 
275 Takeover Directive, arts 12 (1), 12 (2). 
276 CFSA, arts 104 (1), 104 (1)ter. 
277 See Mucciarelli, n 274 above, 101. 
278 This is also supported by the lack of cases in which the shareholders have opted back into the board 
neutrality rule when the Member State has opted-out. See Davies, et al, n 10 above 
279 See Civil Code, arts 2368 (2), 2369 (3), 2370. 
280 CFSA, art 104 (1) ter.  
281 CFSA, art 104 (1) and Takeover Directive, art 9 (2). 
282 CFSA, art 104 (1) bis and Takeover Directive, art 9 (3). 
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frustration of a takeover bid if it has not been authorised by a post-bid shareholder 
resolution.283  
The history of Italian takeover defence regulation in the last five years takes 
us through all the available board neutrality rule options available: a mandatory 
rule, its default non-application, and finally its default application.  The question 
we ask in this section is whether when one takes into account the background 
corporate law rules in Italy, do any of these approaches matter very much to the 
contestability of Italian companies? Do any of these three choices make more than 
a trivial difference to the defensive capabilities of an Italian board? Following the 
structure set forth in the other sections of this article we ask whether under Italian 
corporate law our identified defence types are formally available, whether they can 
be deployed by the board, and if deployed whether they are practically effective.  
 
4.1 FORMAL AVAILABILITY 
 
4.1.1 An Italian poison pill?  
It is uncertain whether a typical US-style shareholder rights plan complies with 
Italian law. As the lack of case law suggests, the issue is more of theoretical 
interest than of practical significance.  
Poison pills involve the issuance of warrants as interim dividends to all 
existing shareholders. This is possible under Italian law. The general principle is 
that dividends are payable (even in kind) when declared by an ordinary resolution 
passed by the general meeting that approves the annual accounts, provided that 
accumulated profits have been actually made and duly documented in the balance 
sheet.284 If the articles so permit, directors of listed companies can distribute 
interim dividends when the previous financial year’s approved audited accounts do 
not show losses relating to that fiscal year or the previous fiscal years.285 The 
articles of association of Italian listed companies would typically provide such 
authority to the directors.  
Whilst the default rule is that shareholder authorisation (to raise capital,286 and 
to grant options) is required under Italian law, the articles (or a subsequent 
amendment of the articles,287 adopted by supermajority resolution passed by two 
thirds of the votes cast at the meeting)288 may also authorise the board to increase 
capital one or more times, up to a specified amount,289 and within a maximum 
period of five years from the date of incorporation or the amending resolution.290 
If such authorisation is not large enough to support the granting of an option to 
                                                     
283 CFSA, art 104 (1). 
284 Civil Code, arts 2433 (1), (2). 
285 ibid, arts 2433bis (1), (2), (3). 
286 ibid, art 2365 (1). 
287 ibid. 
288 ibid, arts 2368 (2), 2369 (3), (7). 
289 Typically, this amount will be lower than the existing capital. 
290 Civil Code, art 2443. 
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buy a share for every existing issued share, the board would have to return to the 
shareholder body to obtain an additional authorisation and in the process of so 
doing would clearly have to explain the purpose behind the increased 
authorisation.   
Once in place, there is, however, some uncertainty about whether the pill 
could be effectively triggered because it is not clear that the bidder can be 
excluded from exercising the warrants and whether shares can be issued at a 
discount to the current market price. Two positions can be broadly identified. The 
conventional view is sceptical on the availability of a typical US-style shareholder 
rights plan in Italy,291 and argues that it probably violates the default principle of 
equal treatment among shareholders.292 More specifically, it maintains that in order 
to exclude the bidder from exercising the warrants and purchasing newly issued 
shares for cash, pre-emption rights have to be waived just as they do under the 
ordinary rules for the raising of share capital. This is possible only in two 
circumstances. First, when the articles, or a subsequent shareholder resolution,293 
allow the board to issue shares to raise capital in an amount not exceeding 10 per 
cent of the outstanding shares, and the issue price is equal to the market value of 
the shares as stated in a special report certified by an auditing company.294 
Secondly, ‘when the interest of the company requires it’, and the authority has 
been granted to the board by a resolution passed by shares representing more than 
half of the company’s outstanding capital.295 These exceptions, however, are of 
limited assistance in constructing an effective poison pill. The 10 per cent cap 
imposed by the first exception is insufficient to issue a pill, and the restriction on 
issuing shares at a discount removes the dilutive effect of the pill, rendering it 
completely ineffective.296 The second exception requires a resolution passed by 50 
per cent of the company’s outstanding capital to authorise the board to issue the 
shares non-pre-emptively and, in addition, shares must be issued at a price 
calculated on the basis of the net value of the assets, having regard to the share 
price trend during the last semester (emissione con sovrapprezzo).297 Again, this 
destroys the dilutive effect of the pill.  
The above orthodox approach has been recently challenged. Some 
commentators have suggested that a shareholder rights plan does not per se 
infringe the principle of equal treatment among shareholders, nor does it 
necessarily violate the pre-emption right principle.298 These commentators argue 
that the execution of the plan is the outcome of a contractual arrangement entered 
into between the company and the shareholders which provides that on the 
                                                     
291 See Desana, n 269 above, 187 and G. Ferrarini, ‘Le Difese Contro le O.P.A. Ostili: Analisi Economica 
e Comparazione’ (2000) Rivista delle Societa’ 776. 
292 CFSA, art 92. 
293 Requiring two-thirds of the votes cast. 
294 Civil Code, art 2441 (4). 
295 ibid, art 2441 (5). 
296 As it is, instead, in a typical US-style shareholder rights plan. 
297 Civil Cod, art 2441 (6). See E. Ginevra Sottoscrizione e Aumento del Capitale Sociale nelle S.p.A. (Milan: 
Giuffre’, 2001), 156. and G. Mucciarelli, Il sopraprezzo delle Azioni (Milan: Giuffre’, 1997), 183. 
298 See M. Gatti, Opa e Struttura del Mercato del Controllo Societario (Milan: Giuffre’, 2004), 356. 
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occurrence of a triggering event the party that crosses the specified ownership 
threshold will be prevented from exercising the warrants and from subscribing for 
the newly issued shares.299 In line with the ratio of the Delaware Supreme Court 
decision in Baker v Providence & Worcester,300 which distinguished between 
discrimination among shareholders (legal) and discrimination among shares 
(illegal), in the case of a takeover bid discriminating amongst shareholders ‘who 
are not in the same conditions’ (‘che non si trovino in identiche condizioni’) does not 
infringe the principle of equal treatment among shareholders ‘in the same 
conditions’ (‘che si trovino in identiche condizioni’) established by Article 92 CFSA.301 
Moreover, for proponents of this position when the warrants are issued, pre-
emption rights are also protected as they are issued proportionately to all the 
shareholders (aumento di capitale riservato al servizio del warrant). It is only on the 
occurrence of the triggering event that the contractual provisions contained in the 
shareholder rights plan (well known ex ante to shareholders) will prevent the bidder 
from exercising the warrants. Pre-emption rights are in this case ‘absorbed’ into 
the contractual options (opzioni di secondo grado) set forth in the warrants.302 
Although the proponents of validity put forward a strong case, the concerns 
articulated by the conventional view are difficult to entirely rebut. The issuance of 
warrants pursuant to a shareholder rights plan is likely to be seen by the courts as a 
way of (contractually) circumventing pre-emption rights.303 This obstacle should 
not be underestimated because the implementation of a shareholder rights plan 
following a triggering event by issuing shares at  a discount would infringe the 
rules on the pricing of shares when pre-emption rights are waived (emissione con 
sovrapprezzo).304 
 
4.1.2 Equity restructuring 
Equity restructuring defences in Italy are all subject to a significant degree of 
shareholder control. As noted above in the analysis of poison pills, article 2443 of 
the Civil Code provides that the articles (or a supermajority resolution that alters 
the articles) can confer on the directors the power to allot new shares one or more 
times, up to a specified amount and within a specified period of up to five years. It 
is common that in listed companies this power is granted on a rolling basis 
although, as a survey on the articles of the companies comprised in the FTSE MIB 
                                                     
299 On this issue (albeit outside the realm of takeover bids), see P. Marchetti, ‘Aumenti di Capitale ad 
Esecuzione Differita: Warrant, Opzione Indiretta’ (1993) Rivista del Notariato  223. 
300 378 Del Supr A 2d 121 (1977). 
301 That is: ‘listed issuers shall guarantee equal treatment to all holders of financial instruments who are in 
the same conditions’. This issue is also discussed by C. Angelici, ‘Parita’ di Trattamento degli Azionisti’ 
(1987) Rivista di Diritto Commerciale 12. 
302 The mechanism is explained by Marchetti, n 299 above, 225 and F. Guerrera, I Warrants Azionari nelle 
Operazioni di Aumento di Capitale (Torino: Giappichelli, 1995), 85. 
303 Guerrera, ibid, 106. 
304 This is also the argument put forward by Gatti, n 298 above, 364. 
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index305 shows, apart from a few exceptions,306 the rolling authorisations are 
typically lower than in the UK.307 That said, as in the UK, shareholders have the 
power to subject such authorisation to conditions,308 and may retain the power to 
revoke (or to adjust the terms of) the authority granted to the directors until shares 
have been allotted.309  
Article 2443 of the Civil Code also provides that the pre-emption rights of 
existing shareholders may be waived in a number of cases when the guidelines set 
forth in the articles are followed by directors (i criteri cui gli amministratori devono 
attenersi).310 First, if shares are issued for in-kind consideration, and the reasons for 
the exclusion and the methods adopted for the determination of the issue price are 
clearly stated.311 Second, where the articles, or a super majority shareholder 
resolution,312 authorise the board to issue shares amounting to less than 10 per 
cent of the outstanding share capital, provided that the issue price is equal to the 
market value of the shares, and this is certified by a special report of the 
company’s auditors.313 A survey of the articles of the companies comprised in the 
FTSE MIB index shows that the authorisation required for the board to make use 
of this exception is not often inserted in the companies’ articles. Rolling 
shareholder waivers of pre-emption rights of this kind are relatively rare.314 Third, 
if the ‘interest of the company requires it’ when directors have been authorised by 
a resolution passed by a majority of fifty per cent of the company’s outstanding 
capital which specifies the criteria to be followed by the directors for indentifying 
the purchasers and for determining the issue price.315  
In Italy therefore, as in the UK, in theory, there is scope for management to 
use the rolling grants of authority to allot shares coupled with the formal 
availability of the exceptions to the pre-emption regime for defensive purposes. 
Importantly, as in the UK, Italian corporate law provides the means to control any 
                                                     
305 It is the primary benchmark Index for the Italian equity markets (about 80 per cent of the domestic 
market capitalisation), and it is based on the performance of 40 companies.  
306 These are companies (eg Ansaldo STS S.p.A., Campari S.p.A., CIR S.p.A., EXOR S.p.A., and 
Italcementi S.p.A.) where the size of the rolling authorisation is significant (greater than the company’s 
outstanding capital).   
307 That is, less than 20 per cent (eg Fiat S.p.A., Enel S.p.A., Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Telecom Italia 
S.p.A., and UniCredit S.p.A.). 
308 See A. Esposito, Art 2443 in G. Fauceglia and G. Schiano di Pepe (eds), Codice Commentato delle S.p.A. 
(Torino: Utet, 2007), vol II, 1316. See also G.D. Mosco, Le Deleghe Assembleari nella Società per Azioni 
(Milan: Giuffre’, 2000), 135 and B. Quatraro, R. Israel, S. D’Amora, and G. Quatraro, Trattato Teorico 
Pratico Delle Operazioni sul Capitale (Milan: Giuffre’, 2001), 484. 
309 See M. Arato, ‘Modificazioni dello Statuto e Operazioni sul Capitale’ in O. Cagnasso and L. Panzani 
(eds), Le Nuove S.P.A. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 2010), 1356, where additional references can be found. 
310 Or in subsequent amendments of the articles. See Massime del Consiglio Notarile di Milano, ‘Delega 
agli Amministratori ex art. 2443 c.c. di Aumento di Capitale con Esclusione del Diritto di Opzione’ 
(2004) at <http://www.scuoladinotariatodellalombardia.org/ParteI.htm#8> (last visited 6 April 2011). 
311 Civil Code, art 2441 (4). The formalities for the evaluation of contributions in kind are set under the 
Civil Code, arts 2441 (6), 2443 (4) as amended pursuant to the Legislative Decree No. 224, 29 November 
2010, art 1. 
312 Two-thirds of the votes cast. Civil Code, arts 2368 (2), 2369 (3), (7). 
313 ibid, art 2441 (4). 
314 Less than one-third of articles of the companies included in the FTSE MIB index.  
315 Civil Code, art 2441 (5). 
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‘abuse’ of this defensive capability. Any perception of managerial abuse could 
result in a reduction in such rolling grants, or where such rolling grants are viewed 
as important for other business purposes, a market practice of more restrictive 
conditions being applied to such grants could develop. Given the current context 
of Italian ownership structures,316 it is of course difficult to predict such 
behavioural patterns. 
With regard to share buy-backs to enhance the proportionate ownership of a 
friendly shareholder or insider, or to effect green mail, under Italian corporate law 
it is not possible for a company to purchase its own shares using its financial 
resources without shareholder approval.317 Such repurchases can only be made out 
of profits available for distribution,318 and within the quantitative (the maximum 
number of shares to be purchased) and temporal (the period of the authorisation 
cannot exceed 18 months) boundaries set forth in a shareholders’ resolution.319 
The number of the shares purchased cannot exceed 10 per cent of the share 
capital, which for the purpose of this calculation includes the treasury shares 
already held by company and its subsidiaries.320  
 
4.1.3 Asset sales/crown jewels defences 
The general difficulties of deploying an asset sale defence in any jurisdiction have 
been noted above. However, these difficulties notwithstanding, the defence is 
formally available to an Italian company as under Italian law there is no 
shareholder approval requirement for an asset sale when the sale is made in 
pursuit of the corporate objects (in attuazione dell’oggetto sociale).321 
 
 
                                                     
316 A number of empirical studies have shown that Italy is a concentrated shareholder jurisdiction where 
the majority of listed companies have a controlling shareholder. Under these circumstances, the typical 
shareholder/board agency issues do not arise as the controlling shareholder has a direct incentive to 
closely monitor the directors’ actions and, in particular, the power and interest to directly replace the 
inefficient management. An introductory analysis of the ownership structure of Italian companies is 
offered by L. Enriques and P. Volpin ‘Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe’ (2007) 21 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 117, where reference is also made to pyramidal ownership as a common way 
of holding control in Italy. See also M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, S. Giacomelli, A.M. Pacces, and S. Trento, 
Proprietà e Controllo delle Imprese in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005); M. Becht, M. Bianco, and C. Mayer, ‘Il 
Controllo delle Imprese Europee’ (2001) Banca Impresa e Societa’ 221; and L. Caprio, ‘La Struttura 
Proprietaria delle Societa’ Quotate Italiane: Quali Evoluzioni Recenti?’ (2001) 2 Banca Impresa e Societa’ 
199. 
317 Civil Code, art 2357ter (1). See F. Carbonetti, L’acquisto di Azioni Proprie (Milan: Giuffre’, 1988). On the 
specific scenario of a takeover bid, see G. Carcano, ‘Acquisto di Azioni Proprie come Tecnica di Difesa 
dale Scalate: la CEE Rafforza il Divieto’ (1992) Rivista delle Societa’ 1310. 
318 Civil Code, art 2357 (1). 
319 ibid, art 2357 (2). 
320 ibid, art 2357 (3). 
321 ibid, art 2380bis. And even if this is not the case (ie the sale is not made with the view of reaching the 
corporate object), the sale cannot be clawed back unless it is proved that the purchaser acted intentionally 
together with the directors to the detriment of the company (exceptio doli). ibid, art 2384 (2). See F. Bonelli, 
Gli Amministratori di S.p.A. (Milan: Giuffre’, 2004), 17. 
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4.2 GENERAL CORPORATE LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF THE BOARD 
CONTROLLED DEFENCES 
 
The default position under Italian law is that the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company,322 unless otherwise provided by law,323 or by the 
company’s articles. This position was reinforced in the 2003 Company law reform, 
which greatly eroded the power of the general meeting to interfere with the 
management of the company.324 In this section, we ask whether there are any 
generally applicable restrictions on the exercise of these powers for defensive 
purposes. More specifically we ask whether the exercise of the powers for 
defensive purposes is restricted by obligations of loyalty or other rules requiring 
shareholder involvement when powers are used defensively.  
It is disputed whether Italian law adopts a different standard of review for the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care. In the past this was not the case, and the 
standard for both duties was based on an objective diligent director standard set 
forth in article 1710 of the Civil Code (diligenza del mandatario).325 Managerial 
discretion was permitted on rather unsettled grounds by reference to the general 
principles on the law of obligations (obbligazioni di mezzi). That said, following the 
Company law reform in 2003, it has been argued that a distinction between the 
two duties can be drawn even in the absence of provisions in the Code to this 
effect.326 More specifically, it has been suggested that the duty to manage the 
company in pursuit of the company’s objects (le operazioni necessarie per l’attuazione 
dell’oggetto sociale)327 can be identified as the source for the duty of loyalty. If this 
view is correct, then it is surely a subjective duty:328 it is what the actual director 
believed in good faith to be the company’s best interest at the time the decision 
was taken. Accordingly, any exercise of power for defensive purposes must 
comply with the (objective/subjective) standard of care of a diligent manager,329 
and although there is some residual uncertainty in this regard, be taken in what the 
director believes furthers the company’s objects.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned uncertainty regarding the role of a 
loyalty obligation in directors’ decision-making and the director primacy bias of 
                                                     
322 Civil Code, art 2380bis. 
323 eg ibid, arts 2364, 2365. 
324 This has been for example with respect to the issuance of debentures. ibid, art 2410. Further evidence 
of this ‘trend’ can be found when considering the creation of ‘dedicated assets to a specified business’ 
(ibid, art 2447-ter) and the issuance of ‘special financial instruments’ (ibid, art 2346 (6)), which belong to 
exclusive competence of the directors. See M. Libertini, ‘Scelte Fondamentali di Politica Legislativa e 
Indicazioni di Principio nella Riforma del Diritto Societario del 2003. Appunti per un Corso di Diritto 
Commerciale’ (2008) Rivista del Diritto Societario 232 and C. Angelici, ‘Introduzione alla Riforma delle 
Societa’ di Capitali’ in P. Abbadessa and G.B. Portale (eds), Il Nuovo Diritto delle Societa’. Liber Amicorum 
Gian Franco Campobasso (Torino: Utet, 2006), 3.  
325 See V. Allegri, ‘Contributo allo Studio della Responsabilita’ Civile degli Amministratori’ (Milan: 
Giuffre’, 1979), 139. 
326 See C. Angelici, ‘Diligentia Quam in Suis e Business Judgment Rule’ (2006) Rivista del Diritto Commerciale 
675. 
327 Civil Code, art 2380bis (1). 
328 See Angelici, n 326 above, 690. 
329 Civil Code, art 2392 (1). 
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contemporary Italian corporate law, the Civil Code imposes some indirect 
restrictions on board action by encouraging, in certain circumstances, shareholder 
involvement in the decision-making process. Before the enactment of the 
Company law reform in 2003, Article 2364 no. 4 of the Civil Code provided for 
the possibility of ex ante shareholder ratification of board decisions (especially) 
when there was scope for controversy as to whether the matter in question was a 
matter for managerial discretion or rather involved essential shareholder 
interests.330 The meaning and effect of the rule was, however, unclear. In the 
absence of a significant body of case law,331 commentators put forward two 
different interpretations. One view argued for the exclusive managerial 
competence of the directors,332 dismissing the need for shareholder authorisation 
unless it was obtained in order to provide directors with a liability waiver against 
possible future claims. Another, and more convincing interpretation,333 suggested 
that even in the absence of a specific mandatory requirement, the need for 
shareholder authorisation under certain conditions was indispensable to fulfil the 
general directors’ duties and good faith (regole generali di comportamento che 
sovraintendono la condotta degli amministratori e il principio di buona fede). In this respect, 
the list of circumstances broadly included decisions of fundamental interest for the 
company (interesse primordiale dei soci),334 such as the sale of essential company assets. 
In our view, pre-2003 a strong case could be made that Article 2364 no. 4 could be 
read to require shareholder approval for the use of defences to intentionally 
interfere with a takeover bid. At a minimum it would have constrained the use of a 
substantial asset sale defence, which as identified above, is the only defence that 
could be deployed without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder approval.  
The Company law reform in 2003 unexpectedly repealed article 2364 no. 4 of 
the Civil Code.335 The doctrinal debate above is, therefore, of limited importance 
today.336 Beyond few specific exceptions provided by the law,337 there is no 
general requirement for shareholder authorisation of managerial decisions.338 
Nevertheless, it is usual practice, and viewed by some commentators as a 
                                                     
330 L’assemblea ordinaria delibera sugli altri oggetti attinenti alla gestione della società [___] sottoposti al suo esame dagli 
amministratori. 
331 Only two cases are reported on the issue (both excluding the mandatory scope of the provision): a) 
Cassazione 7 February 1971, no. 296 Giust. Civ. 1972, 869; and b) Cassazione 15 October 1991, no. 10824 
Dir. Fall. 1992, 766.  
332 See M.S. Spolidoro, ‘Tutela dei Soci della Capogruppo di Germania (con uno Sguardo all’Italia)’ (1986) 
Rivista delle Societa’ 1319.  
333 See V. Calandra, Buonaura Gestione dell’Impresa e Competenza dell’Assemblea nella Societa’ per Azioni (Milan: 
Giuffre’, 1985), 129 and P. Abbadessa, ‘L’Assemblea: Competenza’ in G.E. Colombo and G.B. Portale 
(eds) Trattato delle Societa’ per Azioni (Torino: Utet, 1993), 20. 
334 Abbadessa, ibid, 27. 
335 As this issue was beyond the scope of the law reform mandate from Parliament. See P. Abbadessa, 
‘L’Assemblea nella S.p.A.: Competenza e Procedimento nella Legge di Riforma’ (2004) Giurisprudenza 
Commerciale 542. 
336 See P. Abbadessa and A. Mirone, ‘Le Competenze dell’Assemblea nelle S.p.A.’ (2010) Rivista delle 
Societa’ 307. 
337 eg the purchase of company’s own shares must be authorised by shareholders. Civil Code, art 2357 (2). 
338 ibid, art 2380bis. 
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necessary precondition to satisfying a director’s duties of care and loyalty, that 
when directors take decisions which are of fundamental interest for the company, 
they should request a non-binding opinion from the shareholders and should 
subsequently explain the reason for not following such opinion.339 The effect of 
this practice and expectation is to impose an advisory shareholder vote 
requirement where formally available defences are deployed by the board. 
 
4.3 PRACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The inquiry above has shown that some board-controlled post-bid defences are 
theoretically available and consistent with corporate principles of Italian law. The 
extent of their formal availability is, however, in the absence of shareholder 
authorisation, limited (if not negligible). Only asset sale defences can be 
implemented without any shareholder involvement, and if used for defensive 
purposes a strong case can be made that the board should refer the matter to 
shareholders for an advisory opinion. There is some scope to use ex-ante 
authorisation to issue shares for defensive purposes. However, Italian law would, 
in theory, allow shareholders to restrict board authority to issue the shares by 
placing conditions on any rolling grants of authority if their possible defensive use 
is perceived to be abusive.  Their defensive use would also trigger the advisory 
vote expectation referred to above.  
It may be possible (although, as outlined above, highly contestable and, on 
the balance of probabilities, unlikely) to put in place a poison pill with ex ante 
shareholder approval. Assuming that the significant difficulties for construction of 
the pill can be overcome, it is important to ask, as we asked in the context of the 
United Kingdom, whether such a potentially potent defence could be used to 
entrench management instead of benefiting the company and the shareholders. 
For the same reasons we gave in the context of the UK, the answer appears to be 
no. Under Italian law directors may be removed from office without cause by a 
resolution passed by a simple majority of the votes cast,340 and a meeting can be 
called by shareholders who hold five per cent of the company’s issued shares (or 
the lower percentage provided in the articles).341 Upon the shareholders’ request, 
directors have to call a meeting ‘without delay’,342 and if they fail to do so, the 
meeting may be called by court order.343 It follows that directors who keep a pill in 
                                                     
339 See A. Tina, L’Esonero da Responsabilita’ degli Amministratori di S.p.A. (Milan: Giuffre’, 2008), 271 and 
Libertini, n 324 above, 222. 
340 Civil Code, art 2383 (3). 
341 ibid, art 2367 (1) as recently amended pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 27, art 7 para 1, 27 January 
2010 (published in S.O. no 43 of the G.U. no. 53 of 5.3. 2010) implementing Directive 2007/36/EC on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. OJ L184/17, 14.07.2007).  
342 Civil Code, art 2367 (1). Directors’ discretion for calling the meeting is minimal if the formal requisites 
are met. See E. Grippo, ‘L'assemblea nelle Società per Azioni’ in P. Rescigno (ed), Trattato di Diritto Privato 
(Torino: Utet, 1985), 372.  
343 Unless such request is found to be ‘unjustified’. Civil Code, art 2367 (2). Needless to mention that it 
will be very unlikely to be found ‘unjustified’ a call to decide on the removal of the incumbent directors.  
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place against the clear wishes of its shareholders are likely to face a proxy fight 
resulting in capitulation or removal.  
This same background rule set is relevant for the directors when considering 
the consequences of using available defences in opposition to shareholder wishes. 
In relation to the asset sale defence – the only defence that can be deployed 
without ex-ante or ex-post shareholder approval – the practical expectation that an 
advisory shareholder opinion will be obtained allows the shareholders to make 
their views very clear. Directors who ignore such views in a hostile context are 
likely to find their post-bid position somewhat precarious, even in a widely held 
company. This is a distinguishing feature of the Italian legal framework as 
compared to the United States, and renders the effectiveness of board-controlled 
post-bid defences questionable in practice. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
 
In conclusion, in our view the background corporate law rule set in Italian law 
renders the board neutrality changes that have taken place in the past five years of 
limited import. When analysed through the lens of our three primary takeover 
defences, the decision whether to have a mandatory or default neutrality principle, 
and whether to make it opt-in or opt-out is of limited consequence. The most 
potent of such defences, the poison pill, is in all likelihood not available. No 
formally available defence can be deployed without shareholder involvement – 
either ex-ante approval or an ex-post advisory shareholder opinion. Such 
authorisation or opinion will invariably require the specification of the defensive 
purpose of the authorisation. Once made available, the rules on removal rights and 
the calling of shareholder meetings impose significant informal restraints on how 
directors use those defences. It is true, however, that in contrast to the UK’s 
improper purpose doctrine or the pre-2001 Holzmüller doctrine as applied to 
takeover defences, there is no overarching rule that would prohibit new and 
innovative defences without shareholder approval. But as we noted in Section 1, 
we consider the likelihood of such innovations to be very low. Interestingly, there 
was such a general rule at the time the Takeover Directive was being finalised, but 
it unexpectedly disappeared in 2003. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis set forth in this article suggests that there are two axes upon which 
we can assess the significance or triviality of the adoption of a board neutrality rule 
in European Union Member States. The first axis is the extent to which a Member 
States’ adoption of an unqualified board neutrality rule makes a consequential 
difference to the ability of boards to fashion and deploy defences without 
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requesting shareholder approval to do so: without a board neutrality rule does 
corporate law provide the tools to boards to construct defences, and does it allow 
them to be used without restraint? If one emerges with a positive response from 
the analysis of these questions, the second axis comes into play, namely, the 
potency of such available defences. There are two elements that structure defence 
potency: the first depends upon the nature of the defence itself – an asset sale, for 
example, is significantly less potent than a poison pill; the second element is the 
background corporate governance rules such as rules on director removal and the 
calling of shareholder meetings that enable or restrain the defences’ deployment 
for non-corporate/non-shareholder value purposes.  
In all three of our selected jurisdictions we have seen that there are multiple 
and overlapping fields of regulation. And in each of these jurisdictions there is 
variation in the importance and effectiveness of these different fields of regulation: 
variation in what does the work of restricting board defensive power. The rules 
restricting formal availability are, for example, more important in Germany and 
Italy – where there are serious doubts about the formal availability of a poison pill 
or similar mechanism even with ex-ante shareholder approval – than in the UK. 
General rules requiring explicit shareholder authorisation to use board power for 
defensive purposes are more important in the UK (the improper purpose 
doctrine) and Germany (the Holzmüller doctrine) than in Italy. In the UK and Italy, 
the background corporate governance rule set is a stronger constraint on the 
potency of available defences than it is in Germany where supervisory board and 
management board removal is more difficult. However, whilst there is variation in 
the role played by these different fields of regulation in each of the three 
jurisdictions, the conclusions we have reached for the UK, Germany, and Italy are 
very similar. Although we acknowledge variation in the strength of the argument, 
the case for the triviality of the board neutrality rule can be made in each country.   
In the UK the non-frustration rule is trivial. Only asset sale defences are 
available without shareholder involvement, and even their use requires specific ex-
ante or ex-post defensive authorisation from the shareholders. Where explicit, 
authorisation is granted ex-ante to construct and deploy defences the background 
rule set, and the role of UK institutional investors would prevent their use for any 
purpose that was not compellingly justified in terms of corporate and shareholder 
betterment. In Germany, poison pills are unavailable, although their functional 
substitutes may be with explicit shareholder approval and considerable practical 
difficulty; share issues of greater than 10 per cent of the outstanding shares 
require, in effect, explicit shareholder authorisation to be used defensively. This 
leaves less than 10 per cent share issues and share buy-backs with a general ex-ante 
shareholder authorisation (that may always be subject to shareholder imposed 
conditionality) and only asset sales requiring no authorisation (subject to 
Holzmüller). But asset sales are not potent defences – they are difficult to put in 
place in the tight time constraints of a bid and may be unavailable if the sold assets 
are closely interconnected with the remaining assets.  
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Of our three jurisdictions, Italy arguable presents the weakest case for the 
triviality thesis. Whilst we think that a strong case can be made that poison pills are 
not formally available at all in Italy, there is some doubt about this. But even if 
available they would require ex-ante authorisation in order to issue a large grant of 
warrants. Furthermore, asset sale defences are available without shareholder 
involvement, and there is scope to issue a sizeable block of shares non pre-
emptively to friendly third parties, but again with ex-ante shareholder authorisation. 
Importantly, shareholders unhappy about managerial abuse of defensive capability 
could put a stop to this by imposing conditions on rolling grants of the 
authorisation to allot shares. Furthermore, there is under Italian law a soft 
requirement to obtain the shareholders’ view of defensive actions, but this is more 
of a market practice supported by academic commentary than a legal rule. As in 
the UK, the background Italian corporate governance rule set is strongly pro-
shareholder and would constrain board use of these defences for entrenchment 
purposes.  
What does this mean for the Takeover Directive’s approach to its anticipated 
review of the implementation and effect of the board neutrality rule in the 
European Union? We cannot, of course, extrapolate from these three Member 
States to the remaining 24. However, what is clear from this article’s findings is 
that there is a distinct possibility that the board neutrality rule is not merely trivial 
for the Member States analysed in this paper but trivial for the European Union as 
a whole. Accordingly, looking only at the adoption or rejection of the board 
neutrality rule by the Member States does not enable us to draw any conclusions 
about the extent to which boards of European companies can use defences to 
entrench themselves or throw sand in the wheels of European economic 
integration.  
What is also clear from this analysis is that corporate law in European 
Member States provides regulation of takeover defences just as it provides for the 
regulation of any exercise of corporate power. Such regulation represents a 
balance of board and shareholder power that has evolved since the 19th century. 
Such a balance of power readily addresses surprises that may arise from how 
boards deploy corporate power. A mandatory board neutrality rule cuts through 
this crafted balance of power and in so doing, as any bright line does, overreaches 
itself. This is seen most clearly where it prevents informed shareholders from ex-
ante electing to allow boards to use and control board power for defensive 
purposes when a hostile bid is made. Approaching 140 years ago in a different 
context where board loyalty was questioned, a famous English Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Hatherley, when asked to overrule the election that shareholders had made 
in the articles, observed that it was not ‘for the Court to lay down rules for the 
guidance of men who are adult, and can manage and deal with their own 
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interests’.344 It would, he observed, have been be ‘a violent assumption if any thing 
of that kind were attempted’. We see in Germany, the UK and also in Italy that it 
is difficult for boards to manoeuvre defensively without explicit shareholder 
approval, and that the balance of power allows shareholders to respond if 
managers overstep the mark. And we see from the United States that widely-held 
shareholders, often led by the bidder as shareholder but also pre-emptively prior 
to a bid,345 are not in this context cowered by rational apathy. In European 
Member States where the situation is similar to Germany, the UK, and Italy it 
would indeed, therefore, be a ‘violent assumption’ to assume that a board 
neutrality rule would be beneficial for companies and shareholders and that it 
should be imposed through European legislation.  
A practical conclusion follows from our analysis. In order to determine 
whether or not the board neutrality rule is an important regulatory tool that would 
justify revision of the Directive to make it a mandatory rule within the European 
Union, the Commission should carry out the type of analysis set forth in this 
article for all Member States. If the analysis of the corporate law of these Member 
States suggests that the corporate legal restrictions on defensive action are as 
significant as they are in the UK, Germany, or Italy, then in our view it would be 
time for the European Commission to hang up its neutrality boots. There are 
more important matters that require its attention. 
                                                     
344 Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (1871) LR Ch. App 558, addressing a provision in the 
articles of association allowing disclosure to the board of a conflict arising from a self-dealing transaction 
to render the transaction enforceable and not subject to the common law rules requiring explicit 
shareholder approval.  
345 See Klausner, n 79 above. 
